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INTRODUCTION 
This consolidated appeal raises an issue that affects these three cases, some 
1,400 other pending medical malpractice cases involving similar facts and the 
same question of law, and health care providers throughout Utah. The central 
issue involves the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's four-year statute of repose. 
The plaintiffs/ appellees here and in the 1,400 related cases are seeking to pursue 
medical malpractice cases against a doctor and two hospitals even through the 
treatment and the alleged injury flowing from that treatment occurred 
significantly more than four years before they commenced their actions. These 
plaintiffs, recognizing the time bar, pleaded generally that the injuries were 
II fraudulently concealed" from them by the defendants, attempting to take 
advantage of a narrow exception in the Malpractice Act's statute of repose. 
But the plaintiffs have alleged no specific or particularized facts to support 
the fraudulent concealment allegations, instead making only condusory 
allegations. The district courts said that was permissible, and the plaintiffs could 
proceed into discovery in the otherwise time-barred cases. These district court 
rulings are inconsistent with the plain language of the Act, the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Legislature's intent, and sound judicial policy. The district court 
rulings seriously threaten the repose promised by the Act, and they should be 
reversed. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Issue No.1: Appellees Johanna Bright and Pia Merlo-Schmucker (the 
"Patients") filed complaints (and amended complaints) against st. Mark's alleging 
events that were, on their face, time-barred by the four-year statute of repose 
contained in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. The only way the Patients 
could avoid the four-year statute of repose is to allege statutory fraudulent 
concealment. But neither the complaints nor the amended complaints alleged with 
particularity that St. Mark's "affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal [its] 
alleged misconduct", as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 9(c) and Utah Code §78B-3-
404(2)b). 
In a case that is time-barred on the face of the complaint's allegations, must 
the plaintiff plead specific and particularized facts showing the applicability of the 
narrow exception in § 78B-3-404(2)(b), or may the plaintiff proceed into discovery 
against the defendant despite pleading no facts showing" affirmative fraudulent 
concealment" ? 
Issue No.2: Assuming, arguendo, that a plaintiff must plead particularized 
facts showing the applicability of the narrow exception in § 78B-3-404(2)(b), did 
2 
the district courts err in failing to dismiss the Patients' complaints in their entirety 
when neither complaint identified: 
• who at St. Mark's made the purported statement(s); 
• any statement or statements made to the Patients by anyone at St. 
Mark's that were misleading or were otherwise designed to prevent 
the Patients from discovering their alleged injury; 
• when the statements were made; 
• where the statements were made; 
• how the statements were made; and/ or 
• other particularized facts demonstrating that St. Mark's took any 
affirmative action to deter the Patients from filing suit or discovering 
their causes of action? 
Standard of Review: The district courts' rulings are reviewed for 
correctness, with no deference given by this Court to the rulings below. The 
applicability of a statute of limitations (or repose) is a question of law, which this 
Court reviews for correctness, affording no deference to the district court's 
conclusions. Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14,118. The district court's 
denial of a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss presents a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. See State v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 2019 UT App 31 111 
3 
(citing America W Bank Members, LC v. State, 2014 UT 49, '7). "For the purposes of 
a rule 12(b)(6) dismissat [this Court] accept[s] the complaint's factual allegations 
as true." Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT App 19, '7. The district 
courts' interpretation of a rule of procedure and its application is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Drew v. Lee, 2011 UT 15, '7. 
Preservation: St. Mark's preserved these arguments in its motions to dismiss 
the Patients' complaints and amended complaints. (Bright R. 39-81, 196-225; 
Merlo-Schmucker R. 40-72, 158-186.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Facts 
1. The PFO litigation generally 
This consolidated appeal encompasses three cases: (1) Johannah Bright, 
which is brought against Dr. Sherman Sorensen ("Sorensen")1 and St. Mark's 
Hospital (liSt Mark's"); (2) Pia Merlo-Schmucker, likewise brought against 
Sorensen and St. Mark's; and Lisa Tapp, which is brought against Dr. Sorensen 
and Intermountain Healthcare (IHC). Because St. Mark's is not a party to the Tapp 
1 All claims against Dr. Sorensen are also asserted against his former practice, Sorensen 
Cardiovascular Group. 
4 
case, St. Mark's will focus primarily on the Bright and Merlo-Schmucker cases as 
they apply to St. Mark's, addressing the proceedings in Tapp only where necessary. 
These cases are three of at least 1,400 nearly identical medical malpractice 
cases currently working their way through DOPL and the Utah court system, all 
of whom are represented by counsel for Appellees. (See, e.g., Merlo R. 98; see also 
Bright R. 727 (where plaintiff's counsel states "There's 1,400 of these cases so far.") 
The cases all relate to coronary procedures performed by Dr. Sorensen. 
2. Allegations common to the Amended Complaints 
The Patients involved in these three cases on appeal, along with the other 
1,400 plaintiffs, all assert that Dr. Sorensen performed an unnecessary medical 
procedure upon them, specifically the closure of a septal defect in the heart. (Bright 
R. 82-101, Merlo R. 96-114, Tapp R. 122-148) Bright's surgery occurred on 
December 15, 2009, Merlo-Schmucker's on February 10, 2011, and Lisa Tapp's on 
September 18, 2008. (ld.) 
The procedure at issue in all these cases is a patent foramen ovale ("PFO") 
closure surgery. (Bright R. 84-85, Merlo R. 98-99.) The procedure uses a device, 
deployed by catheter, to close a hole between the upper two chambers of the heart 
that did not close naturally at birth. (See id.) Because of the flow of blood through 
the heart, blood" shunts" through the hole, especially during straining activities. 
(See id.) If the blood that shunts through the hole has a clot in it, that clot can travel 
5 
through the hole into the brain and cause a stroke. Dr. Sorensen closed those holes, 
eliminating or reducing the risk of such a stroke. (See id.) The Patients allege that 
Dr. Sorensen breached the standard of care by performing these PFO closure 
surgeries. (See generally Bright R. 82-101, Merlo R. 96-114, Tapp R. 122-148.) 
As against St. Mark's, the hospital where some of the closures were 
performed, the Patients allege that st. Mark's was institutionally negligent because 
it knew that Dr. Sorensen performed an unusually high number of PFO closures 
and yet failed to provide appropriate oversight to prevent the allegedly 
unnecessary procedures from taking place. (Bright R. 85-87, Merlo R. 99-101) They 
made conclusory allegations that st. Mark's somehow "actively concealed its 
knowledge about Dr. Sorensen's rogue and fraudulent" conduct from "patients, 
third parties, and the public." (Bright R. 92, Merlo R. 105) Continuing on, the 
Patients say they were non-experts who trusted Dr. Sorensen and St. Mark's, and 
because of unidentified "fraudulent statements and misrepresentations" they 
were "until recently unaware of their causes of action." (Bright R. 92, Merlo R. 105) 
Dr. Sorensen also had privileges at an Intermountain Health Services, Inc. 
("Intermountain") hospital and a majority of these PFO cases - including Tapp-
6 
are lodged against Intermountain and Sorensen, under the same theories of 
liability. (Tapp R. 126.2) 
In proceedings below, no one disputed that the Patients' complaints are 
facially repose-barred based on the dates of the procedures stated in the Amended 
Complaints.3 Instead, the Patients argued that they are entitled to proceed-
including with fraud-related discovery-under a statutory exception in the Act 
that tolls the statute of repose in circumstances where the plaintiff has sufficiently 
alleged that the medical provider has affirmatively and fraudulently concealed 
their malpractice. Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b). 
3. Significant dates, as to each Appellee 
Appellee Bright's PFO closure was performed on December 15, 2009. (Bright 
R. 88.) She did not apply for prelitigation review of her medical malpractice claim 
until January 3, 2017, more than seven years after the procedure. (Bright R. 69).4 
2 The amended complaint in Tapp alleged that Dr. "Sorensen performed more than 4,000 PFO and 
ASD closures, the majority of those at IHC" (Tapp. R. 126.) 
3 Also, because Dr. Sorensen stopped practicing in early 2012 (Bright, R. 85; Merlo-Schmucker, R. 
99) and no requests for pre-litigation review in any of these cases were received in DOPL before 
2017, each and everyone of the 1,400 Sorensen PFO cases pending in DOPL and in the district 
courts is similarly facially repose-barred. 
4 Because this is a health care malpractice case, the date of filing of the Request for Prelitigation 
Panel Review ("Request for Review") is the relevant date for statute of limitations and repose 
purposes. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-416(3)(a) ("The filing of a request for prelitigation panel 
review under this section tolls the applicable statute of limitations ... "); Jensen v. Intermountain 
Healthcare Inc., 2018 UT 27, ~ 28 (" Filing a request for Prelitigation Review tolls the statute of 
repose."). A copy of the Request for Review was attached to St. Mark's motions to dismiss the 
Patients' Amended Complaints. (Bright R. 69, Merlo R. 70.) This did not convert the motions to 
dismiss into motions for summary judgment because the Patients' Requests for Review are 
7 
Appellee Merlo-Schmucker's PFO closure was performed on February 10, 
2011. (Merlo R. 102.) She did not apply for prelitigation panel review of her 
medical malpractice claim until January 3, 2017, almost six years after the 
procedure. (Merlo R. 70.) 
Appellee Tapp's PFO closure was performed on September 18, 2008. (Tapp 
R. 132.) She did not apply for prelitigation panel review of her medical malpractice 
claim until January 6, 2017, more than eight years after the procedure. (Tapp R. 
354.) 
In these three cases, the Patients filed complaints following the conclusion 
of the statutorily-required DOPL prelitigation review process: Bright's complaint 
was filed on September 25, 2017 (R. 1-17), Merlo-Schmucker's on September 26, 
2017 (R. 1-16), and Tapp's on August 4, 2017 (R. 1-17.) St. Mark's and the other 
defendants moved to dismiss the complaints as time-barred. (Bright R. 39-81, 
Merlo R. 40-72.) The Patients voluntarily filed amended complaints, and st. Mark's 
and Dr. Sorensen once again moved to dismiss, arguing again that the amended 
complaints were barred by the four-year statute of repose and the exception for 
"referred to in the complaint and [are] central to [their] claim[s]." See Merlo R. 97, Bright R. 83; 
Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co., NA, 2016 UT App. 88, ~ 16 ("In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the 
district court may' consider documents that are referred to in the complaint and [are] central to 
the plaintiff's claim' and may also 'take judicial notice of public records.'" (quoting BMBT, LLC v. 
Miller, 2014 UT App. 64, ~ 7)). 
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fraudulent concealment was not applicable as a matter of law. (Bright R. 196-225, 
Merlo R. 158-186.) 
B. Procedural History 
In all three cases in this interlocutory appeal, the Defendants moved to 
dismiss because the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged the fraudulent 
concealment that they claim prevented them from timely discovering the injury of 
which they now complain. 
Petitions for interlocutory appeal were filed in all three cases and motions 
to stay the underlying litigation were granted. (Bright R. 393, 465, 760; Merlo R. 
466,496,712; Tapp R. 772,782,805.) On January 24, 2019 the appellants in all three 
cases filed an unopposed motion to consolidate the three cases on interlocutory 
appeal. That motion was granted, and on February 15, 2019 this Court granted the 
motion to consolidate and established a briefing schedule. 
c. Disposition of the district courts 
In all three cases in this consolidated appeal, the district courts denied 
portions of the motions to dismiss, albeit with slightly different rationales.5 
In Merlo-Schmucker, Judge Corum acknowledged that the allegations were 
time-barred on the face of the Amended Complaint and recognized that "[i]t is not 
5 In Tapp, Judge Lawrence issued multiple rulings related to the motions to dismiss filed by Dr. 
Sorensen and IHC. That court's rulings will be addressed by Dr. Sorensen and IHC in their briefs 
on appeal. 
9 
clear from the Amended Complaint whether any Defendant acted affirmatively 
within the meaning of the statute to fraudulently conceal anything." (Merlo R. 
402.) The court also commented that "Defendants' argument that inaction or 
omission by a defendant is not sufficient to overcome the time bar appears to be 
well taken." (Id.) Despite these acknowledgments, the court said it "has discretion 
to address these issues under a 12(b) motion" and, in a "close call" said" the Court 
feels the Plaintiff in this case has done enough to move her case into the next 
stage." (Id. at 402-403.) 
Similarly, Judge Scott's order denying the defendants' motions to dismiss in 
Bright concluded that a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was not an appropriate vehicle 
for ruling on the statute of repose issue, noting that it was "not convinced that Rule 
9(c) requires a plaintiff to plead defensive fraudulent concealment in her 
complaint in anticipation that a defendant may assert the statute of limitations or 
statute of repose in a motion to dismiss." (Bright R. 380.) Again, the core issue was 
whether the plaintiff must plead particularized facts alleging affirmative fraudulent 
concealment consistent with Rule 9( c) in order to survive a motion to dismiss in a 
repose-barred case. The District Court stated that it was not" convinced" Bright 
needed to do so. (Id.) 
10 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district courts erred by failing to dismiss all of the Patients' claims and 
allowing them to proceed with fraud discovery because their complaints - facially 
time-barred by the statute of repose - failed to plead particularized facts of any 
affirmative fraudulent concealment by St. Mark's such that the time to file their 
claims would be tolled under Section 78-B-3-404(2)(b). 
It is undisputed that because the Patients' claims arise from health care 
provided to them by the appellants, the claims are subject to Utah Code Ann. §78B-
3-404, which establishes a four-year statute of repose. The parties (and the district 
courts) all further acknowledge that Patients' claims arose more than four years 
before suit was filed; that section 78B-3-404 applies to the Patients' claims; and that 
to avoid being time-barred, the delay in bringing their claims must have been due 
to St. Mark's affirmative fraudulent concealment of their claims. 
As the statute makes clear, the Patients' claims can be saved from the statute 
of repose only if their complaints include allegations of affirmative, fraudulent 
concealment that prevented discovery of the malpractice. Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9 and a long-settled body of dispositive case law make clear that flin 
alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake." (Utah R. Civ. P. 9(c) (emphasis added)). 
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But here, the Patients' attempts to plead around the statute of repose did not 
contain the "who, what, when, where, and how" of the alleged fraudulent 
concealment by st. Mark's. In fact, even after amending their complaints, the 
Patients made no allegations of affirmative fraudulent concealment by St. Mark's, 
let alone particularized allegations. Accordingly, the district courts erred in failing 
to dismiss the Patients' complaints in their entirety because absent allegations of 
particularized facts establishing st. Mark's affirmative fraudulent concealment, 
their complaints failed to satisfy rule 9(c) and were barred by section 7SB-3-
404(2) (b). 
Furthermore, the Merlo-Schmucker court erred in concluding that the 
sufficiency of the Patients' pleading for purposes of avoiding the statute of repose 
was not "ripe" for decision at the 12(b)(6) stage. Indeed, under controlling Utah 
case law and persuasive federal authority, a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is the 
appropriate vehicle and the appropriate time for appellants to assert their statute 
of repose defense. The district courts' rulings ignore that rule 12(b)(6) was 
specifically designed as the principal vehicle for parties to raise perceived 
deficiencies in their opposing parties' pleadings, and for the courts to dismiss 
those complaints that fail to comply with the relevant pleading standards, 
including rule 9(c). 
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Ultimately, the district courts' procedural ruling that untimeliness cannot 
be resolved on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was incorrect, contrary to well-settled 
Utah law, and, if allowed to stand, would thwart the policies underlying the 
statute of repose, rendering it ineffectual. That procedural ruling should be 
reversed, and St. Mark's dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE PATIENTS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE FOUR-YEAR 
STATUTE OF REPOSE 
The facts pertaining to the timing of the care at issue are not in dispute. 
Appellee Bright's PFO procedure occurred in 2009, appellee Merlo-Schmucker's 
PFO procedure occurred in 2011, and appellee Tapp's PFO procedure occurred in 
2008.6 None of the Patients commenced the mandatory prelitigation review until 
2017 -more than seven years after the fact in Bright, almost six years after the fact 
in Merlo-Schmucker, and more than eight years after the fact in Tapp.7 
Accordingly, unless the Patients qualify for at least one of the two enumerated 
exceptions, their claims are barred by the four-year statute of repose. 
6 Bright R. 88, Merlo R. 102, Tapp R. 132. 
7 Bright R. 69, Merlo R. 70, Tapp R. 354. 
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A. The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act Governs Patients' Claims 
By its plain language, the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act ("the Act"), 
Utah Code §78B-3-401 et seq., applies to all of the Patients' claims. The Act defines 
"malpractice action against a health care provider" as" any action against a health 
care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or 
otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health 
care rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care provider." 
Utah Code §78B-3-403(17) (emphasis added). The Act further defines "health care" 
as "any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been 
performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a 
patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement." Id. at 78B-3-
-403(10). 
This Court has previously held that the Act controls claims arising out of the 
medical treatment at issue, regardless of whether the claim is cast as a negligence 
claim, a fraud claim, or something else. Id. at § 78B-3-403(17) (defining a 
"malpractice action against a health care provider" as" any action against a health 
care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or 
otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health 
care rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care provider" 
(emphasis added)); Jensen v. IHe Hasps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 331, 336 (Utah 1997); 
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Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., 2003 UT 23, ~36 (" Because [plaintiff's] own 
allegations arise out of the fact that [defendant] provided mental health services 
directly to him, [plaintiff] was required to follow the procedural requirements of 
the [Act]." Utah law is clear that the negligence, fraud, and civil conspiracy claims 
alleged in this case are all governed by the procedural requirements of the Act. 
Here, St. Mark's and the other appellants all qualify as health care providers 
under the Act,8 and there is no dispute that the Patients' claims arise out of health 
care provided to the Patients by the appellants.9 In fact, the Patients' Amended 
Complaints assert that st. Mark's alleged misconduct occurred exclusively within 
the context of its provision of health care to the Patients.10 In other words, any 
duties owed by St. Mark's to the Patients arose out of their provider-patient 
relationship. Accordingly, any alleged breach of that duty is properly actionable 
under the Act, and not as separate claims. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-3-403(17) and -
404(a). 
8 Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-403(11) (defining "health care facility"), -403(12) (defining "health care 
provider"), and -403(13) (defining "hospital"). 
9 See Bright R. 83, ,-r6 ("At all material times, Defendants were health care providers within the 
meaning of the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-401 et seq., and each 
defendant provided health care services to Plaintiff."); Merlo-Schmucker R. 97, ,-r6 (same). 
10 Bright R. 82-101; Merlo R. 96-114. 
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B. The four-year statute of repose and its two narrow exceptions 
Because the Patients' claims are subject to the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act as a whole, they are also subject to the Act's statute of repose. Section 7SB-3-
404 of the Act establishes a four-year statute of repose:ll 
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider 
shall be commenced within two years after the plaintiff 
or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever 
first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date 
of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence. 
Utah Code Ann. 7SB-3-404 (emphasis added). After the Patients' complaints were 
filed and appellants moved for dismissal under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), Patients filed Amended Complaints, presumably in an effort to plead 
around the statute of repose. However, the allegations in the Amended 
Complaints still demonstrated, by their very terms, that the Patients' claims are 
barred by the four-year statute of repose. 
Section 7SB-3-404 provides just two narrow exceptions to the statutes of 
limitation and repose: 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1): 
(a) in an action where the allegation against the 
health care provider is that a foreign object has been 
wrongfully left within a patient's body, the claim shall be 
barred unless commenced within one year after the 
11 The statute also established a two-year statute of limitations. Although the Patients' claims are 
also untimely under the statute of limitations, only the statute of repose is at issue at this point. 
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plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the 
existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the 
patient's body, whichever first occurs; or 
(b) in an action where it is alleged that a patient has 
been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part 
of a health care provider because that health care 
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently 
conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred 
unless commenced within one year after the patient or 
plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent 
concealment, whichever first occurs. 
The first exception, subsection -404(2)(a), does not apply to the Patients' 
claims because the device implanted to close their PFOs was an intended 
"object" - a surgical implant meant to close the hole between the chambers of the 
heart;12 this subsection applies when an unanticipated, unexpected object is 
"wrongfully" left in a patient's body and may not be discovered until years later. 
The classic example is a surgical sponge that should have been removed before the 
incision was closed, but was wrongfully left in the patient's body. See, e.g., Day v. 
Meek, 1999 UT 28. Although the Patients half-heartedly asserted this exception in 
oral argument on the motions to dismiss, the Tapp court rejected this argument 
eloquently, stating that the first" exception does not apply on its face ... Here, the 
I device' that was placed into [Tapp] was the precise device that was contemplated 
12 Bright R. 88, ~29; Merlo R. 102, ~27. 
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for the surgery[.] ... It would be non-sensical to apply this statute to medical 
devices that were the very object of a patient's surgery." (Tapp R. 750 (emphasis 
in original).) The Bright and Merlo-Schmucker courts did not address the Patients' 
"foreign object" arguments in their written rulings. 
The Patients are thus left with only subsection -404(b )(2) to save their claims 
from being barred by the four-year statute of repose. As discussed below, because 
the Patients did not plead fraudulent concealment with the particularity required 
by Utah R. Civ. P. 9(c), they are not entitled to this narrow exception and their 
claims are thus barred by the statute of repose. 
C. Allegations of fraud must be pleaded with particularity 
To invoke the protection of the statue of repose exception in 78B-3-404(b) (2), 
the Patients' amended complaints must" allege [ ] that [they have] been prevented 
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that 
health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged 
misconduct". Utah Code §78B-3-404(b)(2) (emphasis added). As discussed below, 
the district courts all seemed puzzled by when and how the defendant would 
challenge the time-barred plaintiffs' failure to sufficiently allege affirmative, 
fraudulent concealment of the misconduct. But the statute provides the answer: 
the medical malpractice plaintiff must have alleged affirmative, fraudulent 
concealment in order to get the benefit of the narrow exception. Thus, the parties 
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are not, as the trial courts incorrectly surmised, in the realm of affirmative 
defenses. The statute places the onus on the plaintiff to allege affirmative, 
fraudulent misconduct, and, as discussed below, the rules of civil procedure 
require detailed allegations of such misconduct. 
All allegations of fraud must be pleaded with particularity. Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9(c) provides that "[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must 
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 9(c) (emphasis added). "Rule 9(b)'S13 specificity requirement modifies the 
general rule that requires only a 'short and plain' statement for the claim 
demonstrating entitlement to relief and a demand for judgment identifying the 
relief sought." Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT App ~11 (Pearce, 
J.). 
Rule 9( c) "also serves to deter filing exploratory suits with little information 
in the hopes that discovery will uncover information to support the allegations." 
Id. (citing Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 683 F.3d 239,255 (6th Cir. 
2012) ("Rule 9[c] [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] is designed, not only to 
put defendants on notice of alleged misconduct, but also to prevent fishing 
13 The "particularity" pleading requirement of Utah R. Civ. P. 9 is currently found at rule 9(c). 
Before an amendment to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, however, the particularity 
requirement was contained in rule 9(b). Although some of the cases cited in this argument section 
refer to rule 9(b) instead of 9(c), the substance of the particularity requirement is the same. 
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expeditions .... "); Cornejo v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. CV 11-4119 CAS(VBKx), 
2012 WL 628179, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27,2012) ("Plaintiffs' assertion that they will 
'not know until discovery' the specific misrepresentations made is precisely what 
Rule 9(b) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] seeks to prevent.")). 
Allegations of fraud required to overcome the timeliness bar are subject to 
the same rule 9(c) particularity requirement applicable to all allegations of fraud. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 9(c) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity" (emphasis 
added)); see Roth v. Pedersen, 2009 Utah App. LEXIS 320, *7-8; see also Shah v. 
Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2013 UT App. 261, ,-r10 (explaining Rule 9(c) pleading 
requirements) . 
"[T]he mere recitation by a plaintiff of the elements of fraud in a complaint 
does not satisfy the particularity requirement." Robinson v. Robinson, 2016 UT App 
33, ,-r35 (quoting Armed Forces Ins. Exch. V. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ,-r16 (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, "[c]onclusory allegations, unsupported by 
a recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to carry that burden." Id. 
"The relevant surrounding facts must be set forth with sufficient particularity to 
show which facts the plaintiff believes support the allegations." Id.14 
14 In Robinson, the district court dismissed husband's complaints as untimely on a rule 12(b)(6) 
motion. Because the dates establishing the trigger for the statute of limitations were not contained 
in the complaint's allegations (but instead were derived from pleadings filed in a companion 
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As directly relevant here, the plaintiff must allege with particularity that the 
defendant has prevented her from timely discovering the alleged negligence that 
forms her cause of action by "affirmatively act[ing] to fraudulently conceal the 
alleged misconduct[.]" Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-404(2) (b). Because the statute's 
plain language demands allegations that a health care provider "has affirmatively 
acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct", allegations that the 
defendant has been silent about known malpractice is not enough. Utah Code 
Ann. §78B-3-404(2) (b) (emphasis added). The court in Tapp agreed with this 
proposition, noting that "the legislature used the word I affirmatively acted to 
fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct' ... [a]ccordingly, it would appear 
that Plaintiff cannot rely on Defendants' silence alone in seeking an exception to 
the statute of limitations; she must be able to show I affirmative acts' by IHC and 
by Dr. Sorensen." (Tapp R. 312)15 The Merlo-Schmucker court also acknowledged 
that "[i]t is not clear from the Amended Complaint whether any Defendant acted 
affirmatively within the meaning of the statute to fraudulently conceal anything" 
and that "Defendants' argument that inaction or omission by a defendant is not 
sufficient to overcome the time bar appears to be well taken." (Merlo R. 402.) 
case), the district court erred by not converting the motion to a summary judgment. Robinson, 
2016 UT App 33, ~18. That error was "rendered harmless, however, by [the court of appeals'] 
determination ... that Husband failed to plead fraud with particularity." ld. at ~19. 
15 However, the Tapp court concluded that Tapp "has alleged affirmative conduct by the 
Defendants, albeit around the time of the medical care." (Tapp R. 312) 
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Roth, another case arising out of alleged medical malpractice, is a 
particularly instructive example of what must be pleaded. Roth v. Pedersen, 2009 
Utah App. 313,2009 WL3490974 (unpublished opinion16). In Roth, the plaintiff had 
a colon surgery in 2004 and, six months later, a doctor realized that the wrong 
section of the colon had been removed and a second surgery was performed in 
early 2005. ld. at *2. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against a general surgeon in May 
2006 and filed another complaint against a second doctor (Dr. Pedersen) in August 
200S. ld. Because the plaintiff was obviously aware of his legal injury in May 2006 
when he filed the first complaint, Dr. Pedersen moved for judgment on the 
pleadings, arguing the complaint was time-barred by the two-year statute of 
limitations. ld. at *3. The district court agreed with Dr. Pedersen and dismissed the 
plaintiff's complaint. ld. 
On appeal, among other things, the plaintiff argued that the district court 
should not have dismissed the case against Dr. Pedersen because he had alleged 
in his complaint that Dr. Pedersen had engaged in fraudulent concealment of his 
role in causing the legal injury, thereby saving the claim under Section 7SB-3-
404(2) (b) of the Malpractice Act. ld. at *2. Specifically, Roth alleged that it 
/I appeared" that there had been concealment of the malpractice because the 
16 fI[U]npublished decisions of the Court of Appeals issued on or after October I, 1998, may be 
cited as precedent in all courts of the State." Utah R. App. P. 30(f). 
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physician knew of various specific problems with the procedure at issue but did 
not speak up about them, despite a legal duty to do so, and that this "failure to 
speak" prevented him from discovering his injury, sufficient to toll the statute of 
limitations. ld. at *2-3. 
The Roth court considered but ultimately rejected the plaintiff's argument. 
ld. at *4. Relying on Rule 9(c),s particularity pleading standard, the Roth court 
recognized that the fraudulent concealment allegations must be stated with 
particularity: "mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a 
recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude dismissal." ld. 
at *3 (quoting Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181,1186 (Utah 1989)). 
The court explained that plaintiff's allegations were insufficient to grant relief on 
a fraudulent concealment theory because the plaintiff did not sufficiently plead 
"affirmative actrion] to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct" from the 
plaintiff, as required by the Malpractice Act. ld. at *3 (emphasis added). For 
example, Roth did not allege that he had ever "consulted with [Dr.] Pedersen 
regarding the surgery or that Pedersen had ever given information to Roth that 
"misrepresented or concealed his involvement in the surgery." ld. Moreover, 
nowhere in the complaint did Roth allege that he was "precluded from further 
discussing the surgery." ld. Ultimately, without any specific allegations of active 
and fraudulent concealment of the malpractice by the defendant, the plaintiff's 
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allegations of fraudulent concealment were "nothing more than a mere conclusory 
allegation that is insufficient to preclude dismissal" on the pleadings.17 ld. at *3 
(citing Chapman, 784 P.2d at 1186). 
The court's decision was based, in part, on its analysis of Rule 9( c)' s 
particularity requirement in Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181, 
1186 (Utah 1989). In Chapman, this Court helpfully distinguished between 
sufficient and insufficient allegations in this context. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
hospital defendants "withheld information regarding the cause of [the patient's] 
injuries and 'misinformed [the Chapmans] by, among other things, advising them 
that the brain damage sustained by [the patient] was an unavoidable event which 
was not caused by any misconduct on the part of any of the defendants.'" ld. at 
1186 (emphasis added). In other words, the Chapmans alleged that the hospital 
defendants acted affirmatively by "advising them" in a way that prevented their 
discovering the injury. Because the Chapmans' allegations relied upon affirmative 
action rather than passive inaction, this Court concluded that the plaintiffs' 
allegations against the hospital defendants were a "sufficiently clear and specific 
description of the facts underlying the Chapmans' claims of fraudulent 
17 The Roth court's dismissal on the pleadings presented functionally the same procedural posture 
as in these cases, where the motions to dismiss were brought under rule 12(b)(6). 
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concealment to support our conclusion that the requirement of Rule 9[c] has been 
met." ld. at 1186 (alteration to reflect current numbering of Rule 9(c)). 
But the Chapman court II took a different view of the Chap mans' claims" 
against another defendant, Dr. Myer. ld. Specifically, this Court held that "[i]n 
contrast to the fact-specific claims against the hospital defendants, the charges 
against Dr. Myer are vague and conclusory, telling virtually nothing about what 
Dr. Myer allegedly did or neglected to do." ld. This Court reiterated that "[t]he 
sufficiency of plaintiff's pleadings ... must be determined by the facts pleaded 
rather than the conclusions stated", id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted) and therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to Dr. Myer. 
ld. (citing Petelerv. Robison, 81 Utah 535,17 P.2d 244 (Utah 1932) (discussed further, 
infra)). 
While not a statute of limitations or repose case, Shah is also instructive on 
the pleading requirements under Rule 9(c). Shah, 2013 UT App. 261. In Shah, the 
plaintiff alleged that his healthcare provider had engaged in fraudulent 
concealment and other torts. ld. In support of her claims, the plaintiff II generally 
[alleged] that all of the Defendants failed to provide them with complete and 
accurate information regarding [the patient's] health and treatment after she 
received that treatment and therefore breached their fiduciary duty to her and 
conducted acts of fraud or negligent misrepresentation." ld. at '12. But these 
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generalized allegations were found to be insufficient to state a fraud claim 
(including a fraudulent concealment claim) under Rule 9(c) because the plaintiff 
had failed to "explain which defendants had what knowledge, which defendants 
made what statements, or how the Defendants specifically breached their 
individual fiduciary duties." Id. 
Ultimately, absent facts setting forth the "who, what, when, where and 
how" of the fraud, a plaintiff's "general assertion of wrongdoing against the 
Defendants" will not meet the particularity requirement for pleading a claim of 
fraud under Rule 9(c). Id. Shah reiterates the well-recognized doctrine that, in 
pleading fraud, a plaintiff must identify the "who, what, when, where and how" 
of the fraud. Shah, 2013 UT App. 261 at ~~10, 12. In sum, to avoid the repose bar, 
the Patients must sufficiently allege affirmative fraudulent concealment. The duty 
to state sufficient facts is the plaintiff's duty at the outset of the case. 
D. The Patients' allegations were not pleaded with the particularity 
needed to withstand a motion to dismiss 
In the cases at bar, the Patients did not sufficiently plead their affirmative 
fraudulent concealment allegations. At the very end of the complaints, there is a 
"fraudulent concealment/ equitable tolling"18 claim that is nothing but conclusory 
18 The concept of equitable tolling has no application to this case, because the Malpractice Act 
contains provisions that govern a potential tolling of the statute of limitations and statute of 
repose. There cannot be equitable tolling when there is a statutory discovery rule. See Russell 
Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ~ 25 (internal citation omitted) ("[W]e now clarify and 
emphasize that these equitable exceptions apply only where a statute of limitations does not, by 
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buzzwords, unsupported and vague allegations that appellants took" affirmative 
steps," made "misrepresentations," engaged in "misleading conduct," and 
otherwise" concealed" their malpractice. This is simply insufficient under the rule 
9 case law discussed above. 
The Patients do not allege who concealed anything from them, what 
specifically was concealed, when the purported concealment happened, where it 
happened, or how the actor did what he or she did to prevent them from 
discovering their injury/claims. Importantly, the Patients do not identify any 
conversations with anyone at st. Mark's, let alone a specific effort to deter them 
from filing suit or discovering their injury. Indeed, the Patients admit that the 
discovery of their supposed claims came as a result of an advertisement campaign 
perpetrated by counsel, not because of any actual injury they incurred. (Bright R. 
92, Merlo R. 105.) The lack of any such allegations against St. Mark's is not 
surprising given that St. Mark's merely provided a catheterization laboratory in 
which an independent, licensed physician performed various procedures. Indeed, 
the Patients' Amended Complaints focused primarily on their allegations that Dr. 
its own terms, already account for such circumstances-i.e., where a statute of limitations lacks a 
statutory discovery rule."); Stephenson v. Elison, 2017 VI App. 149, ~ 29 (tolling under statutory 
and equitable discovery rules is usually mutually exclusive"); Moore v. Smith, 2007 VI App 101, 
~26. 
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Sorensen had breached the standard of care in multiple respects. (Bright R. 82-101, 
Merlo R. 96-114.) 
The Patients argued below that St. Mark's never affirmatively reached out 
to them, by, for instance, sending a mailing or making a public statement 
informing them that their procedures had not been medically necessary. (Bright R. 
99, Merlo R. 112.) The Patients allege at one point that St. Mark's "did nothing to 
notify" them of Dr. Sorensen's "fraudulent and/ or negligent practices" of which 
it allegedly had "awareness." (Bright R. 92, Merlo R. 105.) But "not doing 
something" is simply not affirmative conduct.19 And, again, the Patients did not 
allege that any particular individual at st. Mark's knew that their particular 
procedure was not necessary, nor have they alleged facts, or cited case law, to 
suggest that st. Mark's would have an affirmative duty to investigate all 
procedures performed in its catheterization laboratory for medical necessity, make 
the post-facto determination that a procedure was indeed unnecessary, and then 
inform the Patients of that. 
Conclusory allegations of fraudulent concealment mixed with general 
allegations that the hospital did not "reach out" at some point are simply not 
sufficient allegations of affinnative, fraudulent misconduct. Simply put, the 
19 See, e.g. Bryan A. Garner, ed., Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining "affirmative" as 
"involving or requiring effort <an affirmative duty>."). 
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Patients' claims are time-barred on the face of their Amended Complaints. And 
because they failed to plead the fraudulent concealment exception to the four-year 
statute of repose with the particularity required by Rule 9(c), the district courts 
should have dismissed the claims in their entirety, with prejudice. 
E. The district courts erred in ruling that the Patients' Amended 
Complaints were sufficient to avoid the statute of repose 
The district courts operated under the assumption that the claims alleged 
were untimely on their faces and that there was no question but that the statutes 
of limitation and repose in 78B-3-404 applied to the Patients' claims.2o (Merlo R. 
400-405; Bright R. 374-389; Tapp R. 309.) 
All three courts also agreed, to varying degrees, that the Patients did not 
adequately allege affirmative fraudulent concealment. In Merlo-Schmucker, the court 
found that the defendants' argument that inaction or omission were not 
"affirmative acts" within the meaning of 78B-3-404 was "well-taken". (Merlo R. 
402.) In Bright, when discussing the Patient's "fraudulent non-disclosure or 
concealment" claim, the court stated that: 
With respect to St. Mark's, the court agrees that Ms. 
Bright fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. She does not plead any facts from which the 
court may infer that St. Mark's knew that her particular 
surgery was not medically necessary prior to the surgery. 
And while st. Mark's alleged failure to notify patients 
20 Judge Lawrence, in Tapp, found that expressly. (Tapp R. 309 (" [all] of Plaintiff's claims are 
governed by the ... four-year statute of repose") (emphasis in original).) 
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that Dr. Sorensen's privileges had been suspended for 
performing unnecessary closure procedures may be 
sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss based on the 
statute of repose, it cannot form the basis of an 
affirmative fraudulent concealment claim. Indeed, Ms. 
Bright could not have relied on St. Mark's silence 
regarding the suspension in agreeing to the surgery 
because the suspension happened after her surgery." 
(Bright R. 384-85.) And in Tapp, the court recounted the defendants' argument that 
II there must be I affirmative' concealment, rather than concealment by silence", and 
commented that "[a] plain reading of the statute appears to support that view." 
(Tapp R. 312.) 
The district courts correctly perceived that, as discussed above, the Patients 
did not even allege that they had interacted with st. Mark's, let alone that st. Mark's 
had somehow caused them to delay timely filing their claims against the hospital. 
Yet despite recognizing that the Patients' allegations were conclusory and lacking 
the requisite specificity as to the "who, what, when, where, and how" of the 
alleged fraudulent concealment, the district courts nonetheless ordered further 
discovery, rather than wholesale dismissal of the Patients' claims, on the theory 
that it was II too early" to dismiss the Patients' claims. 
The district courts erred, however, in concluding that a rule 12(b)(6) motion 
was not the appropriate vehicle for addressing the timeliness and sufficiency of 
the pleadings. And, as noted above, these conclusions were based on a 
misperception that the it was the defendant's duty to raise the statute of repose as 
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an affirmative defense, as opposed to the plaintiff's statutory duty to plead 
sufficient facts regarding' affirmative, fraudulent concealment at the outset of the 
case. 
In Merlo-Schmucker, for instance, the court stated that it "is not convinced 
this issue is procedurally ripe at the Rule 12(b) stage and questions whether the 
Plaintiff is obligated to combat an affirmative defense, however likely or inevitably 
it is to be raised, in its initial pleading." (Merlo R. 402). In Bright, the court noted 
that it was "unable to conclude at this time that the statue of repose was not tolled" 
and that it was "not convinced that rule 9(c) requires [the Patients] to plead 
defensive fraudulent concealment in [their] complaint[s] in anticipation that a 
defendant may assert the statute of limitations or statute of repose in a motion to 
dismiss." (Bright R. 379-380) In Tapp, the court ruled that /I A plaintiff is not 
required to forecast the defenses a defendant may assert" and noted that "before 
this issue is resolved, a plaintiff must have an opportunity to present facts 
supporting its response to a statute of limitations defense", (Tapp R. 314,316) 
A Rule 12 motion is a well-recognized vehicle for challenging the timeliness 
of a claim. See Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, 18 (inclusion of 
dates in the complaint indicating that the action is untimely renders it subject to 
dismissal for failure to statue a claim' ... under Rule 12(b)(6).") 
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Similarly, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that 
Rule 12(b) (6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
permits the dismissal of complaints that fail to state 
claims upon which relief can be granted. In the context 
of fraud-based causes of action, rule 9(b) provides that 
the circumstances constituting fraud must be pleaded 
with particularity in order to state a claim. 
Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT App 19, ,-r8 (Pearce, J.). In Fidelity, 
the court of appeals affirmed the 12(b)(6) dismissal of Fidelity's complaint because 
it "fails to allege the elements of a fraud claim with the particularity our rules 
require." Id. at ,-rll (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 9[c]). Fidelity "did not identify any false 
representation Worthington made to Fidelity [but] rather asserted only that the 
Defendants as a group had failed to disclose information to Fidelity". Id. at ,-r12 
(noting that I/[o]ur supreme court has explained that a cause of action for fraud 
against multiple defendants must J supply . . . information regarding [each 
defendant's] personal participation in fraud"). 
More recently, in Young Resources, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the 
12(b)(6) dismissal of untimely claims because "the face of the complaint ... 
establish [ es] that the claims are time-barred" and because the allegations did not 
give any" factual basis for tolling the statute." Young Resources Ltd. Partnership v. 
Promontory Landfill LLC, 2018 UT App 99, ,-r31 (citing Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., 
Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041, n.4 (10th Cir. 1980) and Butler v. Deutsche Morgan Grentell, 
Inc., 140 P.3d 532 (2006)); see also Christensen v. Am. Heritage Title Agency, Inc., 2016 
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UI App 36, ,30 (affirming dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) because "the complaint 
contain[ ed] no allegations that the ... defendants were involved in fraudulent 
conduct or committed any wrongdoing" such that statute of limitations should be 
equitably tolled); Mast v. First Madison Servs., Inc., 2009 UI App 162, *1 n.2 (stating 
"[d]ismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) ... is appropriate where the claim is time-barred 
based on the allegations of the complaint itself" and rejecting equitable discovery 
allegations (unpublished)); Lowery v. Brigham Young Univ., 2004 UI App 182, *1 
(affirming dismissal under rule 12(b) (6) based on facial untimeliness and 
inadequate pleading of allegations that tolling should be based on alleged mental 
illness (unpublished)); see also Bivens v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2017 UI 67, ,54, n.6 
(affirming dismissal because complaint facially pleaded the absence of exhaustion 
of administrative remedies, which is an affirmative defense); Feteler v. Robison, 81 
Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 (Utah 1932) (evaluating adequacy and particularity of the 
plaintiff's allegations of fraudulent concealment on demurrer);21 Coroles v. Sabey, 
21 In Peteler, the plaintiff alleged medical negligence and defensively alleged that the defendant 
doctor had fraudulently concealed his negligence over a continuing course of treatment lasting 
years. ld. at 245-46. The doctor demurred, arguing that the claim was barred by the catch-all four-
year statute of limitations (there was no statute of limitations specific to medical negligence claims 
at the time). ld. at 246. Although Peteler is an old case, it shows that this Court has long assessed 
the sufficiency of fraudulent concealment allegations in a plaintiff's complaint. In fact, this Court 
stated that if the plaintiff's complaint had alleged fraud "merely in general terms, or that the 
defendant through 'fraud' or 'fraudulently' induced the plaintiff to refrain from bringing an 
action against the defendant without any accompanying statement of facts upon which the 
statement of fraud is based", then the demurrer would have been warranted. ld. at 250. 
Ultimately, though, in Peteler, this Court concluded that" sufficient accompanying facts are stated 
with respect to the alleged fraud ... to entitle her to give evidence with respect thereto", and 
therefore reversed the trial court's grant of defendant's demurrer. ld. Unlike in Peteler, in these 
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2003 UT App 339, 1128, 30 (affirming dismissal on 12(b)(6) motion because 
plaintiffs failed to plead the circumstances constituting fraud with particularity 
and citing as examples that plaintiffs did not "identify exactly who made the 
alleged representations" or "indicat[e] who made [a] statement to them"). 
Similarly, in Russell Packard, this Court applied the same methodology to 
test the untimeliness of a pleading, concluding that the plaintiff's allegations were 
adequate to avoid 12(b)(6) dismissal, but only because the plaintiff "made a prima 
facie showing of fraudulent concealment" . Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 
UT 14, 1113, 40. Likewise, in Tucker, this Court cited to federal authority 
supporting the proposition that dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) is procedurally 
proper when a complaint facially alleges facts showing that a limitations period 
has run and tolling allegations are not adequately pleaded under rule 9. Tucker, 
2002 UT 54,18 (quoting SA Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure §1357 
at 345 (2d ed. 1990)).22 
cases the Patients have not stated II sufficient accompanying facts ... with respect to the alleged 
fraud[.]" 
22 Ample federal authority on this point exists, and it appears to be uniform. See Boettcher v. Conoco 
Phillips Co., 721 Fed. Appx. 823, 824-25 (10th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal because untimeliness 
is evident from allegations and tolling is supported only by a II conclusory statement as to the 
application of [tolling without relevant] factual allegations"); Lee v. Rocky Mtn. UFCW Unions and 
Employers Trust, 13 P.3d 405, *1 (10th Cir. 1993) (limitations defense "may be appropriately 
resolved on a 12(b)(6) motion [because] the dates given in the complaint make clear that the right 
sued upon had been extinguished"); Ballen v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 23 F.3d 335, 336-37 (10th 
Cir. 1994) (affirming 12(b)(6) dismissal based on facial untimeliness and because plaintiff did not 
meet obligation to "plead with particularity the facts which give rise to the claim of fraudulent 
concealment"); Summerhill v. Terminix, Inc., 637 F.3d 877, 879-80 (8th Cir. 2011) (" once it is clear 
34 
The district courts' rulings in these cases are inconsistent with this settled 
precedent. Instead, the district courts here concluded that the Patients do not need 
to plead specific, particularized facts showing affirmative fraudulent concealment. 
The court's rationale for this conclusion in Merlo-Schmucker is somewhat unclear; 
that court recognized that the plaintiff had the obligation to identify these facts 
and did not present such facts, but the court appeared to take a wait-and-see 
approach, improperly invoking its /I discretion" on this matter of law. In Bright, 
again, the court seemed hesitant to hold the plaintiff to her pleading obligation, 
saying it was not /I convinced" plaintiff had the duty to plead specific facts 
supporting a claim for affirmative, fraudulent concealment /I at this juncture". 
Similarly, in Tapp the court acknowledged that the /I additional allegations" 
contained in paragraphs 79-84 of Tapp's amended complaint /I appear to be 
conclusory in nature without any measure of particularity." (Tapp R. 313) In spite 
of that recognition, the court concluded that Tapp II did not have a duty in the first 
instance to plead those allegations with particularity" and asserted that II [t]here is 
no authority requiring a plaintiff to plead facts in her complaint that are responsive 
from the face of the complaint that an action is [untimely plaintiff must] meet the burden of 
sufficiently pleading that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment saves his otherwise time-barred 
claims"); Adams v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 2014 WL 1670090, *2 (D. Utah April 28, 2014) (rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal where the complaint's dates made clear that the right sued upon has extinguished and 
the plaintiff fails to come forward with a factual basis to toll); Warnick v. McCotter, 2003 WL 
23355718, *3-4 (D. Utah Dec. 29,2008) (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal where dates in complaint made 
clear that clam was untimely and assertion of fraudulent concealment was unsupported). 
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to a yet-to-be-asserted affirmative defense." (Tapp R. 313) The district court's 
reluctance was echoed when it stated it "cannot conclude that a plaintiff is 
required to plead facts that would be needed to defeat an affirmative defense in 
its opening pleading." (Tapp R. 313) 
The district courts' rulings were erroneous. Most fundamentally, they 
ignored the plaintiff's statutory obligation to allege affirmative, fraudulent 
concealment and the duty created by rule 9 and supporting case law to plead 
affirmative fraudulent concealment with particularity. Instead, the trial courts 
treated appellants' statute of repose argument as any other affirmative defense 
that would get fleshed out in discovery. That is simply inconsistent with the 
requirements of the Act" the Utah (and Federal) Rules of Civil Procedure, and the 
case law. Moreover, as discussed below, it creates bad judicial policy that sharply 
undermines the purposes of the statute of repose and the courts' role in deciding 
pure legal issues prior to using the courts' and the parties' resources to chase 
discovery into claims that are time-barred by statute. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURTS' RULINGS UNDERMINE THE POLICY 
UNDERLYING STATUTES OF REPOSE 
The Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act in 1976, 
including a policy statement titled "Legislative findings and declarations -
Purpose of Act", with three subsections outlining the important public policy 
goals meant to be served by the Act. Utah Code Ann. §7SB-3-402. Importantly, one 
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of those three subsections was devoted solely to the statutes of limitations and 
repose contained in §78B-3-404: 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the Legislature to 
provide a reasonable time in which actions may be 
commenced against health care providers while limiting 
that time to a specific period for which professional 
liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and 
accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural 
changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of 
claims. 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-402(3) (emphasis added). 
Statutes of repose serve important public polices and are strictly followed. 
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2182-83 (2014) (I/[s]tatutes of repose effect 
a legislative judgment that a defendant should be free from liability after the 
legislatively determined period of time"); Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. 
Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188, 189 (Utah 1989) (I/Statutes of repose promote 
the public goal of certainty and finality ... and terminate liability at a set time."). 
Consequently, courts do not expand legislatively-created exceptions to a repose 
period, such as the narrow circumstances defined in § 78B-3-404(2)(b) that the 
Patients fail to meet. Id. 
This important policy has been recognized by Utah courts in a variety of 
contexts. See Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194 (Utah 
1999) (holding builder's statute of repose does not violate Open Courts clause); 
Sorensen v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1987) (holding medical malpractice statue 
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of repose barred complaint filed nine years after care at issue); Dayley v. USA, 2018 
WL 1590254 (D. Utah 2018) (rejecting argument that medical malpractice statute 
of repose violates Open Courts clause). 
If the district courts' rulings in these cases are allowed to stand, the Patients' 
unsupported fraudulent concealment theory will be advanced not just in the three 
cases currently on appeal, but in the 1,400 similar cases currently in the pipeline.23 
And there is little doubt that other plaintiffs in other types of medical malpractice 
litigation would see these rulings as an invitation to completely disregard not just 
the statute of limitation but also the statute of repose. 
Allowing these rulings to stand would thoroughly undermine the purposes 
of finality that statutes of repose are designed to promote and would create 
damaging policy, increase the burden on our courts, and expressly contravene the 
Legislature's clearly stated intent in enacting a medical malpractice statute of 
repose. Indeed, under the Patients' theory, the statute of repose creates essentially 
no barrier to entry into the court system for facially stale claims. That is, a medical 
provider would be subject to costly litigation indefinitely, so long as a plaintiff 
23 In the lower court proceedings, the parties expressly acknowledged that these cases were "test" 
or "bellwether" cases that would be brought to ruling on the motions to dismiss (since all the 
claims were time-barred on their faces). See, e.g., Bright R. 726-727, Tapp R. 999-1002. In Bright, at 
oral argument on the motions to dismiss, the court noted that "there was some discussion 
generally between the judges about whether a consolidation would be appropriate so that the 
parties don't end up - I assume there are similar issues in all cases with, you know, five, ten 
different rulings on the same motions to dismiss." (Bright R. 726.) 
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merely vaguely alleged in the complaint that the provider knew the procedure 
involved malpractice and did not affirmatively tell the plaintiff that. Whether or 
not the allegation was true, and whether or not the provider took any affirmative 
action to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the mere conclusory 
allegation would be enough to initiate costly discovery and consume the time and 
resources of health care providers. This underscores why the exceptions to the 
statute of repose bar are supposed to be very narrow, and why the affirmative 
fraudulent concealment exception is required to be pleaded with particularity. 
III. NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING IS NOT A RECOGNIZED 
CAUSE OF ACTION AND THEREFORE THE DISTRICT COURT 
SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED COUNT IV IN MERLO-
SCHMUCKER 
Because all of the Patients' claims are barred by the statute of repose as 
argued above, and because the Patients failed to plead with the particularity 
required by rule 9(c) to avail themselves of the statutory exception to the four-year 
repose period, all of their claims should have been dismissed by the district courts. 
As an additional basis for dismissal of Count IV in the Patients' Amended 
Complaints, negligent credentialing is not a recognized cause of action under Utah 
law. The Bright court ruled correctly on this issue-albeit without much 
discussion- and ordered dismissal of the Fourth Claim for Relief for negligent 
credentialing "because it is not recognized in Utah[.]" (Bright R. 388) The Merlo-
Schmucker court did not address the negligent credentialing claim in its order on 
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the motions to dismiss, but because it did not list Count IV as a dismissed claim, it 
is presumably still alive in that case. 
The Bright court's dismissal of Count IV was correct as a matter of law. In 
2011 the Utah Legislature enacted Utah Code §78B-3-425, entitled "prohibition on 
cause of action for negligent credentialing". That statute provides, in its entirety, 
that "[i]t is the policy of this state that the question of negligent credentialing, as 
applied to health care providers in malpractice suits, is not recognized as a cause 
of action." ld. 
By the plain language of §78B-3-425, then, Count IV of Merlo-Schmucker's 
Amended Complaint is ineffective and should be dismissed on that separate basis. 
See Waddoups v. Noorda, 2013 UT 64, ,-r13 (holding that §78B-3-425 did not apply 
retroactively to care at issue before the statute's enactment); Andresen v. Salt Lake 
Regional Med. etr., 2014 WL 7387281 (Utah Dist. Ct.) (granting motion to dismiss 
negligent credentialing claim and rejecting plaintiff's claim that statute was 
unconstitutional). 
For this additional reason, St. Mark's asks this Court to reverse the Merlo-
Schmucker court's denial of its motion to dismiss Count IV for negligent 
credentialing, based on the application of §78B-3-425. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Patients' claims in these three cases - and in the 1,400 related cases-
are barred, on the face of the complaints, by the four-year statute of repose found 
in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. Because the claims are time-barred, and 
because the Patients failed to plead with the particularity required, the district 
courts' denial of the defendant health care providers' motions to dismiss was in 
error. St. Mark's respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decisions of the 
district courts below, dismissing the Bright and Merlo-Schmucker cases with 
prejudice. 
DATED this 18th day of March, 2019. 
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 
ELD 
TA WNI J. ANDERSON 
NATHANE. DORSEY 
Attorneys for St. Mark's Hospital 
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Rule 9. Pleading special matters. 
(a) Capacity or Authority to Sue; Legal Existence. 
(1) In General. Except when required to show that the court has jurisdiction, a pleading need not allege: 
(A) a party's capacity to sue or be sued; 
(8) a party's authority to sue or be sued in a representative capacity; or 
(C) the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party. 
(2) Raising Those Issues. To raise any of those issues, a party must do so by a specific denial, which 
must state any supporting facts that are peculiarly within the party's knowledge. 
(b) Unknown parties. 
(b)(1) Designation. When a party does not know the name of an opposing party, it may state that fact in 
the pleadings, and designate the opposing party in a pleading by any name. When the true name of the 
opposing party becomes known, the pleading must be amended. 
(b)(2) Descriptions of interest in quiet title actions. If one or more parties in an action to quiet title are 
designated in the caption as "unknown," the pleadings may describe the unknown persons as "all other 
persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the 
pleading adverse to the complainant's ownership, or clouding its title." 
(c) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with 
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions 
of a person's mind may be alleged generally. 
(d) Conditions precedent. In pleading conditions precedent, it is sufficient to allege generally that all 
conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. When denying that a condition precedent has 
been performed or has occurred, a party must do so with particularity. 
(e) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or official act it is sufficient to allege that 
the document was legally issued or the act was legally done. 
(f) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, a judicial or 
quasi-judicial tribunal, or a board or officer, it is sufficient to plead the judgment or decision without showing 
jurisdiction to render it. 
(g) Time and place. An allegation of time or place is material when testing the sufficiency of a pleading. 
(h) Special damage. If an item of special damage is claimed, it must be specifically stated. 
(i) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state the facts 
showing the defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is barred by the statute, referring 
to or describing the statute by section number, subsection designation, if any, or designating the provision 
relied on sufficiently to identify it. 
(j) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute, an ordinance, or a right derived from a 
statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to the statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its passage or 
by its section number or other designation in any official publication of the statute or ordinance. The court will 
take judicial notice of the statute or ordinance. 
(k) Libel and slander. 
(k)(1) Pleading defamatory matter. In an action for libel or slander it is sufficient to allege generally 
that the defamatory matter out of which the action arose was published or spoken concerning the plaintiff. 'I 
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Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant shall serve 
an answer within 21 days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and 
within 30 days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within 21 days after the service. The plaintiff shall 
serve a reply to a counterclaim in the answer within 21 days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered 
by the court, within 21 days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a 
motion under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the 
court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for responding 
to the remaining claims: 
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within 14 days after notice of the court's action; 
(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be 
served within 14 days after the service of the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is 
required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency 
of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading 
if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other 
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion 
or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a 
responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to 
delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (1) - (7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, 
whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule 
shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearings 
and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so 
vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may 
move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the 
defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed 
within 14 days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the 
pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive 
pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 21 days after the service of the 
pleading, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 
impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the other 
motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include 
therein all defenses and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall 
not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in 
subdivision (h) of this rule. 
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(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by 
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 
defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim 
may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the 
trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the 
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if 
made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule .1lli.Q.} in the light of any evidence that may have been 
received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any motion 
made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this state, or 
is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and 
charges which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the 
reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient 
sureties as security for payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No 
security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered within 30 




TITLE 78B, CHAPTER 3, PART 4 
UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT 
This part shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Health Care Malpractice Act." 
78B-3-402. Legislative fmdings and declarations - Purpose of act. 
(1) The legislature fmds and declares that the number of suits and claims for damages and the amount of judgments and settlements 
arising from health care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these increases the insurance industry has substantially 
increased the cost of medical malpractice insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and increased claims is increased 
health care cost, both through the health care providers passing the cost of premiums to the patient and through the provider's 
practicing defensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers 
are discouraged from continuing to provide services because of the high cost and possible unavailability of malpractice insurance. 
(2) In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the adverse effects which these trends are producing in the 
public's health care system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures designed to encourage private insurance 
companies to continue to provide health-related malpractice insurance while at the same time establishing a mechanism to ensure the 
availability of insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from private companies. 
(3) In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against 
health care providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which professional liability insurance premiums can be 
reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims. 
78B-3-403. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to practice audiology under Title 58, Chapter 41, Speech-language Pathology and 
Audiology Licensing Act. 
(2) "Certified social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a certified social worker under Section 58-60-205. 
(3) "Chiropractic physician" means a person licensed to practice chiropractic under Title 58, Chapter 73, Chiropractic Physician 
Practice Act. 
(4) "Clinical social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a clinical social worker under Section 58-60-205. 
(5) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of insurance as provided in Section 31A-2-102. 
(6) "Dental hygienist" means a person licensed to engage in the practice of dental hygiene as defined in Section 58-69-102. 
(7) "Dentist" means a person licensed to engage in the practice of dentistry as defmed in Section 58-69-102. 
(8) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing created in Section 58-1-103. 
(9) "Future damages" includes a judgment creditor's damages for future medical treatment, care or custody, loss of future earnings, 
loss of bodily function, or future pain and suffering. 
(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any 
health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement. 
(11) "Health care facility" means general acute hospitals, specialty hospitals, home health agencies, hospices, nursing care 
facilities, assisted living facilities, birthing centers, ambulatory surgical facilities, small health care facilities, health care facilities 
owned or operated by health maintenance organizations, and end stage renal disease facilities. 
(12) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, association, corporation, or other facility or institution who causes to 
be rendered or who renders health care or professional services as a hospital, health care facility, physician, registered nurse, licensed 
practical nurse, nurse-midwife, licensed Direct-entry midwife, dentist, dental hygienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory technologist, 
pharmacist, physical therapist, physical therapist assistant, podiatric physician, psychologist, chiropractic physician, naturopathic 
physician, osteopathic physician, osteopathic physician and surgeon, audiologist, speech-language pathologist, clinical social worker, 
certified social worker, social service worker, marriage and family counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, licensed athletic trainer, or 
others rendering similar care and services relating to or arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of persons and officers, 
employees, or agents of any of the above acting in the course and scope of their employment. 
(13) "Hospital" means a public or private institution licensed under Title 26, Chapter 21, Health Care Facility Licensure and 
Inspection Act. 
(14) "Licensed athletic trainer" means a person licensed under Title 58, Chapter 40a, Athletic Trainer Licensing Act. 
(15) "Licensed Direct-entry midwife" means a person licensed under the Direct-entry Midwife Act to engage in the practice 
of direct-entry rnidwifery as defined in Section 58-77-102. 
(16) "Licensed practical nurse" means a person licensed to practice as a licensed practical nurse as provided in Section 58-31b-
301. 
(17) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, 
breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care 
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rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care provider. 
(18) "Marriage and family therapist" means a person licensed to practice as a marriage therapist or family therapist under Sections 
58-60-305 and 58-60-405. 
(19) "Naturopathic physician" means a person licensed to engage in the practice of naturopathic medicine as defmed in Section 58-
71-102. 
(20) "Nurse-midwife" means a person licensed to engage in practice as a nurse midwife under Section 58-44a-301. 
(21) "Optometrist" means a person licensed to practice optometry under Title 58, Chapter 16a, Utah Optometry Practice Act. 
(22) "Osteopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice osteopathy under Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical 
Practice Act. 
(23) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care provider, under a contract, express or implied. 
(24) "Periodic payments" means the payment of money or delivery of other property to a judgment creditor at intervals ordered by 
the court. 
(25) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to practice pharmacy as provided in Section 58-17b-301. 
(26) "Physical therapist" means a person licensed to practice physical therapy under Title 58, Chapter 24b, Physical Therapy 
Practice Act. 
(27) "Physical therapist assistant" means a person licensed to practice physical therapy, within the scope of a physical 
therapist assistant license, under Title 58, Chapter 24b, Physical Therapy Practice Act. 
(28) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice medicine and surgery under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act. 
(29) "Podiatric physician" means a person licensed to practice podiatry under Title 58, Chapter 5a, Podiatric Physician Licensing 
Act. 
(30) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a person licensed to practice as a physician in this state under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah 
Medical Practice Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(31) "Psychologist" means a person licensed under Title 58, Chapter 61, Psychologist Licensing Act, to engage in the practice of 
psychology as defined in Section 58-61-102. 
(32) "Registered nurse" means a person licensed to practice professional nursing as provided in Section 58-31b-301. 
(33) "Relative" means a patient's spouse, parent, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half 
brother, half sister, or spouse's parents. The term includes relationships that are created as a result of adoption. 
(34) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, attorney-in-fact, person designated to make decisions on behalf 
of a patient under a medical power of attorney, or other legal agent of the patient. 
(35) "Social service worker" means a person licensed to practice as a social service worker under Section 58-60-205. 
(36) "Speech-language pathologist" means a person licensed to practice speech-language pathology under Title 58, Chapter 41, 
Speech-language Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act. 
(37) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or unlawful act or omission proximately causing injury or damage 
to another. 
(38) " Unanticipated outcome" means the outcome of a medical treatment or procedure that differs from an expected result. 
78B-3-404. Statute of limitations - Exceptions - Application. 
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider shall be commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, 
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after 
the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1): 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a 
patient's body, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use 
of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever 
first occurs; or 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care 
provider because that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be 
barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should 
have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
(3) The limitations in this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability under Section 78B-2-1 08 
or any other provision of the law. 
78B-3-40S. Amount of award reduced by amounts of collateral sources available to plaintiff - No reduction where subrogation 
right exists - Collateral sources defined - Procedure to preserve subrogation rights - Evidence admissible - Exceptions. 
(1) In all malpractice actions against health care providers as defined in Section 78B-3-402 in which damages are awarded to 
compensate the plaintiff for losses sustained, the court shall reduce the amount of the award by the total of all amounts paid to the 
plaintiff from all collateral sources which are available to him. No reduction may be made for collateral sources for which a 
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FILED OISTR~CT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D.; SORENSEN 




RULING AND ORDER RE PENDING 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
Case No. 170906790 
June 20, 2018 
Judge Laura S. Scott 
Before the court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint filed by 
Defendants Shennan Sorensen, M.D. and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group (collectively Sorensen 
Defendants) and the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Defendant St. Mark's 
Hospital. The court heard oral argument on the Motions on May t, 2018 and took them under 
advisement. Having considered the briefing, arguments of counsel, and applicable law, the court 
now issues the following Ruling and Order: 
ALLEGATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
1. This case involves surgery to close a patent foramen ovale (PFO), which is a hole 
in the heart that occurs after birth when the foramen ovale fails to close. 1 According to the First 
Amended Complaint, approximately 25% of the healthy population have a PFO and will never 
require any treatment or evaluation. PFO closure is not medically necessary unless there is a 
confinned diagnosis of recurrent cryptogenic stroke or transient ischemic attack (TIA).2 
I The second type of hole is called an atrial septal defect (AS D), which is considered a birth defect. 




2. Dr. Sorensen is a cardiologist who was practicing interventional cardiology. Dr. 
Sorensen had privileges at St. Mark's.3 
3. From approximately 2002 to 2012, Dr. Sorensen performed more than 4,000 PFO 
and ASD closures, many of those at St. Mark's. He performed these procedures at a rate that 
dwarfed the rest of the country.4 
4. St. Mark's was on notice that Dr. Sorensen was engaged in the practice of 
regularly performing unnecessary and invasive PFO closures on his patients because of the sheer 
volume of the procedures and complaints from other practitioners and employees.s 
5. Also, during the hiring and credentialing process, Dr. Sorensen told St. Mark's 
how and under what conditions he would perform PFO and ASD closures, including that he 
would perform closures on patients who did not have recurrent cryptogenic strokes.6 
6. The catheterization lab at St. Mark's became financially dependent on Dr. 
Sorensen's practice. Consequently, despite knowing that Dr. Sorensen was performing medically 
unnecessary closures, St. Mark's continued to court his business, provide a platform and 
assistance to him, and advertise and promote Dr. Sorensen's practice.7 
7. The Sorensen Defendants and St. Mark's created false statements and documents 
to conceal the fact that Dr. Sorensen was performing medically unnecessary closures, including 
medical charts. 8 
3 Id., ~ 16. 
4Id. 
s Id., ~ 17. 
6 Id., ~ 18. 
7 Id., ~~ 22, 23. 
8 Id., ~20. 
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8. In 2007, Plaintiff Johannah Bright was referred to Dr. Sorensen because she was 
experiencing migraines and a transesophageal echo cardiogram showed right to left shunting 
across the atrial septum. She was seen by Dr. Sorensen on September 21, 2007 at his offices, 
where she underwent a transthoracic echocardiogram (TIE) with bubble study and transcranial 
Doppler study (TCD).9 
9. On October 1,2007, Western Neurological Associates performed a brain MRI on 
Ms. Bright, which was interpreted as "normal contrast-enhanced MRI of the brain."IO 
10. On November 28, 2007 at a follow-up office visit, Dr. Sorensen did not 
recommend closure because "she [did] not have risk stratification features [for stroke] other than 
migraine. I I 
11. On November 4, 2009, Ms. Bright returned to Dr. Sorensen for a second 
consultation. Dr. Sorensen's neurologic exam was not comprehensive. Contrary to his 2007 note, 
Dr. Sorensen's 2009 note states that Ms. Bright "has high risk features for stroke" and "an 
interatrial septal aneurysm.,,12 
12. To induce her to undergo the PFO closure procedure, Dr. Sorensen told Ms. 
Bright that she had a high risk of a debilitating stroke and that the PFO closure would be 
effective and was medically necessary in order to prevent strokes. Dr. Sorensen also provided 
Ms. Bright with a PFO handout that contained fraudulent statements and unsupported data. 13 
9 Id, ~25. 
10 Id, ~26. 
11 Id, ~ 27. 
12 Id., ~28. 
13 Id, ~ 34. 
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13. Dr. Sorensen's statements were made with the intent to induce Ms. Bright to 
undergo the unnecessary procedure. Ms. Bright did not know the statements were false or 
misleading. And she relied on these statements in agreeing to undergo the procedure. 14 
14. On December 15,2009, Ms. Bright underwent the PFO closure procedure. IS 
15. On March 18, 2010 and June 28, 2018, Ms. Bright had follow-up tests in Dr. 
Sorensen's office. 16 
16. On or about June 27, 2011, Dr. Sorensen's privileges at another hospital were 
suspended. St. Mark's CEO Steve Bateman and physician liaison Nikki Gledhill were aware of 
the suspension. 17 
17. St. Mark's knew about Dr. Sorensen's practices but did not inform Ms. Bright that 
she may have had a medically unnecessary surgery and chose not to reimburse her or her 
insurance company for the procedure. To this day, St. Mark's has actively concealed its 
knowledge about Dr. Sorensen's practices from patients, third party payors, and the public. IS 
18. Because of their fraudulent statements and omissions, Ms. Bright only learned of 
Defendants' misconduct as a result oflawyer advertising. 19 
19. Ms. Bright has suffered significant damages, including undergoing an 
unnecessary surgical procedure and hospital stay, paying significant medical expenses, physical 
pain, and emotional anguish.2o 
14 Id, ~ 34. 
15 Id, ~29. 
16 Id, ~~ 30, 31. 
17 Id, ~ 19. 
18 Id., ~ 35. 
19 Id, ~ 37. 
20 Id, ~ 38. 
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RULING AND ORDER 
Rule 12(b) Standard 
On a rule 12(b)( 6) motion, the court determines whether the plaintiff has alleged enough 
facts in the complaint to state a cause of action?! The court presumes "the factual allegations in 
the complaint are true and ... draw[ s] all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.,,22 The court's sole concern is "the sufficiency of the pleadings, [and] not the 
underlying merits of [the] case.',23 Thus, a plaintiffs claims are subject to dismissal only when 
the allegations of the complaint "clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim.,,24 
Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion) 
The Sorensen Defendants first argue that Ms. Bright's claims are barred by collateral 
estoppel because her allegations "are the same basic allegations asserted in the qui tam case and 
are based on the same facts and issues." As discussed at the hearing, the court is not persuaded 
by this argument because the issue decided in the qui tam case - whether Defendants "submitted 
objectively false claims for payment" - is not identical to the issues presented in this case. Nor 
have the Sorensen Defendants established the other elements of collateral estoppel, i.e., that the 
parties are the same or in privity with each other or that the issues in this case have been 
completely, fairly, and fully litigated in the qui tam case.25 
21 Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1997). 
22 Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 2011 UT App 232, ~ 16, 263 P.3d 
397,404. 
23 Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ~ 8, 104 P.3d 1226, 1230 (citing Alvarez, 933 P.2d at 989). 
24 Alvarez at 989. 
25 Gunmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33, ~ 9, 232 P.3d 1059, 1067. 
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Statue of Repose 
Defendants argue that Ms. Bright's claims are barred by the statute of repose set forth in 
the Utah Medical Malpractice Act. As set forth below and applying the motion to dismiss 
standard, the court is unable to conclude at this time that the statute of repose was not tolled as 
result of Defendants' alleged affirmative acts to fraudulently conceal their misconduct.26 
"As a general rule, a statute of limitations begins to run upon the happening of the last 
event necessary to complete the cause of action. ,,27 Once a statute begins to run, a plaintiff must 
file her claim before the limitations period expires or the claim will be barred.28 However, there 
are "two narrow settings in which a statute of limitations may be tolled until the discovery of 
facts forming the basis for the cause of action.,,29 "The first setting ... involves situations in 
which a relevant statute of limitations, by its own terms, mandates application of 
the discovery rule. ,,30 This setting is referred to as the statutory discovery rule. The second 
setting, which is referred to as the equitable discovery rule, applies only where a statute of 
limitations does not, by its own terms, already account for such circumstances.,,31 
As a preliminary matter, the parties appear to agree that Ms. Bright's claims are subject 
to the statute of limitations found in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, which contains a 
statutory discovery rule. The Act also includes a statue of repose, which bars claims commenced 
more than four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence" 
26 At the hearing, Ms. Bright argued the foreign object exception of § 78B-3-404(2)(A) also applies. The court 
disagrees. The catheter was not "wrongly left" within her body. And there is no allegation that Ms. Bright did not 
know that it was placed in her body as part of the closure procedure. 
27 Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84,86 (Utah 1981) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
28 See id. 
29 Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ~ 21, 108 P.3d 741,746 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at~25 
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regardless of when a plaintiff discovers her injury.32 However, "in an action where it is alleged 
that a patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care 
provider because that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the 
alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered 
the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurS.,,33 Thus, "[i]n medical malpractice cases, the 
running of the statute of limitations [can only be] tolled when a patient has been prevented from 
discovering the malpractice by the health care provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent 
concealment. ,,34 
Defendants first argue Ms. Bright failed to plead fraudulent concealment with 
particularity under Rule 9( c). The court is not convinced that Rule 9( c) requires a plaintiff to 
plead defensive fraudulent concealment in her complaint in anticipation that a defendant may 
assert the statute of limitations or statute of repose in a motion to dismiss. With the exception of 
Roth v. Pedersen discussed further below, the appellate courts in the cases cited by Defendants 
were reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, not a dismissal under Rule 
12(b).35 The court accordingly rejects this argument at this juncture. 
Turning to their primary argument, as the court understands it from the briefing and oral 
argument, Defendants assert the statute of repose was not tolled because Ms. Bright has not 
alleged "active" concealment. "Fraudulent concealment requires that one with a legal duty or 
32 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(1). 
33 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(2) (emphasis added). 
34 Roth v. Joseph, 2010 UT App 332, , 31, 244 P.3d 391, 398 (emphasis added) (citing Chapman v. Primary 
Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d ll81, 1184-87 (Utah 1989) (applying statute». 
35 See Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996) (summary judgment); Chapman v. Primary Children's 
Hasp., 784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989) (summary judgment); Roth v. Joseph, 2010 UT App 332, 244 P.3d 391 (summary 
judgment); see also Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327,333 (Utah 1997) (motion in limine and trial). 
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obligation to communicate certain facts remain silent or otherwise act to conceal material facts 
known to him. ,,36 Defendants do not dispute that a health care provider is required to disclose 
"material information concerning the patient's physical condition. This duty to inform stems 
from the fiduciary nature of the relationship and the patient's right to determine what shall or 
shall not be done with his body.,,37 But, Defendants argue, the statute's inclusion of the phrase 
"affirmatively acted" means that silence or "pure, uninvited non-disclosure" is not enough. 
According to Defendants, Ms. Bright must have "directly engaged with each defendant that she 
accuses of affirmatively fraudulently concealing her injury from her, and then the individual 
defendant must have done something affirmative to prevent her from discovering her legal 
injury." Defendants also appear to argue the "engagement" and "affirmative" responsive act 
must have occurred after the surgery. 
Defendants' argument finds some support in the holding in Roth v. Pedersen, a short 
memorandum decision. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of the motion for 
judgment on the pleadings because the plaintiff "failed, as required by the Act, to commence 
litigation within two years of discovery of his legal injury, which occurred, at the latest, in May 
2006" when he initiated legal action against his general surgeon. The Court then addressed the 
plaintiffs alternative argument regarding fraudulent concealment. Because the plaintiff did not 
allege that he consulted with the defendant about the surgery or that the defendant provided him 
with information that misrepresented or concealed his involvement in the surgery, the Court 
affirmed the district court's dismissal of his claim "for failure to plead fraud with sufficient 
particularity.,,38 In Roth, the plaintiff had inquiry notice. There was no such notice here. 
36 Jensen, 944 P.2d at 333. 
37 Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348,354 (Utah 1980) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
38 Pedersen v. Roth, 2009 UT App 313. 
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Even if the court were to ultimately rule the fraudulent concealment had to occur after the 
surgery, the court is not convinced that "affirmatively acted" in the context of this case means 
that Ms. Bright must have "directly engaged" with the Sorensen Defendants and St. Mark's if 
she can demonstrate they were in possession of specific facts they had a duty to disclose and the 
disclosure of such facts would have put her on notice of the alleged misconduct.39 For St. 
Mark's, such facts may include Dr. Sorensen's suspension or any other specific information it 
may have had regarding Dr. Sorensen's alleged misconduct in connection with Ms. Bright's 
surgery. Finally, with respect to Dr. Sorensen, Ms. Bright has alleged some affirmative acts that 
occurred after the surgery, including his follow-up treatment and billing. 
Defendants also argue that Ms. Bright has failed to allege she conducted any 
investigation or inquiry into the medical care she received from Dr. Sorensen, or that her 
investigation was thwarted by any alleged affirmative act on the part of Defendants. A plaintiff 
seeking to save her claims under the discovery rule must demonstrate she exercised reasonable 
diligence in not bringing her claims in a timely manner. This is a fact-intensive matter for the 
fact finder to ascertain except in only "the clearest of cases. ,,40 In determining reasonable 
diligence, the fact finder considers the "difficulty a plaintiff may have in recognizing and 
diligently discovering a cause of action when a defendant affirmatively and fraudulently conceals 
it.,,41 Here, Ms. Bright's claims relate to an allegedly unnecessary surgery which did not have an 
adverse outcome or any complications. And, unlike in the cases cited, Defendants have failed to 
39 St. Mark's argues that it has no duty to "analyze and disclose judgments by a treating physician, particularly when 
no physical complication is alleged" or to "investigate all procedures performed in its cath lab for medical 
necessity." The court does not necessarily disagree. But the fact that St. Mark's may not have had a duty to analyze 
or investigate does not necessarily mean that it did not have a duty to disclose specific information it may have had 
related to Ms. Bright's surgery. 
40 Russell Packard Dev., Inc., at~ 39. 
41 Berenda, 914 P.2d at 54. 
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identify any facts that Ms. Bright had knowledge of that would have put her on inquiry notice 
that the surgery was medically unnecessary.42 As the Utah Supreme Court observed in Colosimo, 
Ms. Bright cannot be expected to inquire about the existence of a claim that is entirely concealed 
from her when there is nothing to put her on inquiry notice. Accordingly, the court is unable.to 
conclude that her "failure to investigate possible misconduct" makes this one of the "clearest of 
cases" that warrants dismissal pursuant to a motion to dismiss.43 
Having rejected Defendants' statute of repose arguments in light of the motion to dismiss 
standard, the court now turns to the other possible grounds for dismissing Ms. Bright's claims. 
Ms. Bright's Negligence Claim (Second Claim/or Relief) 
Defendants argue that Ms. Bright's common law negligence claim is duplicative of her 
negligence (health care malpractice) claim. The court agrees because Ms. Bright has not 
identified a common law or statutory duty that Dr. Sorensen or St. Mark's owed her that is 
independent from the duty that arose from their provider-patient relationship. Accordingly, Ms. 
Bright's Second Claim for Relief should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted. 
42 See Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, ~ 30, 221 P.3d 256 ("it seems somewhat 
incongruous that an injured person must commence a malpractice action prior to the time he knew, or reasonably 
should have known, of his injury and right of action."); Russell Packard Dev., Inc. at ~ 28 ("to permit one practicing 
a fraud and the concealing it to plead the statute of limitations when, in fact, the injured party did not know of and 
could not with reasonable diligence have discovered the fraud" would be ''not only subversive of good morals, but 
also contrary to the plainest principles of justice"); Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979) (the law ought 
not to be construed to destroy a right of action before a person even becomes aware of the existence of that right) 
(all internal citations omitted). 
43 See Day v. Meek, 1999 UT 28, ~ 21, 976 P.2d 1202 (interpreting statute in light of obvious unfairness of 
unreasonably barring claims that have been fraudulently concealed). 
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Ms. Bright's Negligent Credentialing Claim (Fourth Claim/or Relief) 
In support of her negligent credentialing claim against St. Mark's, Ms. Bright alleges that 
St. Mark's had a duty to "periodically monitor and review the qualifications and competency of 
its medical staff' and that it breached this duty, presumably in connection with its granting of 
privileges to Dr. Sorensen. However, "[i]t is the policy of this state that the question of negligent 
credentialing, as applied to health care providers in malpractice suits, is not recognized as a 
cause of action.,,44 Accordingly, Ms. Bright's Fourth Claim for Relief should be dismissed 
because it fails to state claim upon which relief may be granted. 
Fraudulent Non-Disclosure or Concealment (Fifth Claim/or Relief) 
To prevail on her fraudulent non-disclosure or concealment claim, "a plaintiff must prove 
the following three elements: (1) the nondisclosed information is material, (2) the nondisclosed 
information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to 
communicate.,,45 Ms. Bright alleges Defendants "owed a duty [to] disclose important facts, such 
as the medical necessity of [her] medical care." This is simply the converse of her primary fraud 
and negligent misrepresentation allegation, i. e., Dr. Sorensen told her the procedure was 
medically necessary because she had a high risk of stroke. Ms. Bright also fails to identify a duty 
different or separate from the duty that arises from the provider-patient relationship. Thus, the 
cOUli concludes her fraudulent concealment claim against the Sorensen Defendants is subsumed 
within her malpractice, fraud, and/or negligent misrepresentation claims. 
With respect to St. Mark's, the court agrees that Ms. Bright fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. She does not plead any facts from which the court may infer that St. 
44 Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-425. 
45 Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, ~ 24,48 P.3d 235 
11 
00384 
Mark's knew that her pa11icular surgery was not medically necessary prior to the surgery.46 And 
while St. Mark's alleged failure to notify patients that Dr. Sorensen's privileges had been 
suspended for performing unnecessary closure procedures may be sufficient to defeat a motion to 
dismiss based on the statute of repose, it cannot form the basis of an affirmative fraudulent 
concealment claim. Indeed, Ms. Bright could not have relied on St. Mark's silence regarding the 
suspension in agreeing to the surgery because the suspension happened after her surgery. 
Accordingly, the court dismisses Ms. Bright's fraudulent concealment claim.47 
Ms. Bright's Other Claims Are Not Subsumed into a Single Malpractice Claim 
Defendants argue Ms. Bright's other claims should be dismissed because they are 
subsumed into her First Claim for Relief for Negligence - Health Care Malpractice. Specifically, 
Defendants argue that all alleged breaches of duty in a provider-patient relationship are "properly 
actionable under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and not as separate claims." They base 
this argument on § 78B-3-403, which defines a malpractice action against a health care provider 
as "any action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, 
wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of 
health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care provider. ,,48 
Although the court agrees that Ms. Bright's negligence claim is subsumed within her malpractice 
claim, the court is not otherwise persuaded that the Act prevents Ms. Bright from bringing her 
negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and civil conspiracy claims, which do not necessarily depend 
upon an "alleged breach of duty to provide accurate information concerning the necessity of 
46 In general, a hospital does not owe an independent duty to obtain a patient's informed consent to treatment. See 
Buu Nguyen v. IHC Med Servs., Inc., 2102 UT App 288, ~ 11,288 P.3d 1084. 
47 Additionally, if there is other material information that Defendants failed to disclose prior to her surgery, Ms. 
Bright has not sufficiently identified it as required by Rule 9(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which is 
discussed further below. 
48 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-403. 
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medical care relating to the PFO closure procedure" as argued by Defendants. Indeed, duty is 
not an element of a fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or civil conspiracy claim. 
Rule 9(c)'s Particularity Requirementfor Affirmative Claims 
Ms. Bright's fraud, misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy claims against Defendants 
implicate Rule 9( c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a plaintiff to state with 
particularity the circumstances constituting the fraud. Pleadings satisfy this standard only if they 
include a sufficiently clear and specific description of the facts underlying the claim,49 including 
the who, what, when, where, and how. 50 Defendants argue Ms. Bright has failed to satisfy this 
standard and, consequently, these claims should be dismissed. As discussed further below in 
connection with each claim, the court concludes that Ms. Bright has complied with Rule 9(c). 
Negligent Misrepresentation and Fraud Claims (Third and Sixth Claims for Relief) 
With respect to her fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, Ms. Bright must prove 
"(1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing material fact (3) which 
was false and (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made recklessly, 
knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation, (5) for 
the purpose of inducing [her] to act upon it and (6) that [she], acting reasonably and in ignorance 
of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to [her] injury and 
damage."SI 
The court concludes Ms. Bright has pled her fraud and negligent misrepresentation 
claims with sufficient particularity as to Dr. Sorensen. Ms. Bright alleges the "who" (Dr. 
Sorensen), "what" (false statement that she had a high risk of debilitating stroke and PFO closure 
49 Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT 6, ~ 8, 323 P.3d 571. 
50 Webster v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 2012 UT App 321, ~19, 290 P.3d 930. 
51 Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT App 19, ~ 10, 344 P.3d 156, 159. 
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was necessary to prevent strokes), "where" (Dr. Sorensen's offices), "when" (November 4, 
2009), and "how" (Dr. Sorensen told her the false statement directly and provided her with a 
handout containing false statements and data). She sets forth how she reasonably relied on the 
allegedly false statements in deciding to have the surgery and how she was damaged thereby. 
In contrast, Ms. Bright has not pled these claims with sufficient particularity with respect 
to St. Mark's. It does not appear St. Mark's made any statements to Ms. Bright prior to the 
surgery. And to the extent her claims against St. Mark's are based on a failure to disclose, Ms. 
Bright has not alleged facts from which the court can infer that St. Mark's owed a duty to her 
prior to surgery or that she somehow relied on St. Mark's silence in deciding to have the surgery. 
Civil Conspiracy (Seventh Claim for Relief) 
With respect to her civil conspiracy claim, Ms. Bright must prove "(1) a combination of 
two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object 
or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result 
thereof. ,,52 In addition, Ms. Bright must prove an underlying tort. ,,53 
The court determines that Ms. Bright has satisfied Rule 9( c) because she has sufficiently 
identified the co-conspirators (the Sorensen Defendants and St. Mark's), the object to be 
accomplished (increasing income for the Sorensen Defendants and profits for st. Mark's by 
performing medically unnecessary surgeries), the meeting of the minds (discussing during hiring 
and credentialing how Dr. Sorensen would perform the closures and under what circumstances, 
ignoring complaints by other physicians, providing special treatment to Dr. Sorensen, and 
advertising and promoting Dr. Sorenson's closure practice), the unlawful, over acts (making 
52 Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co., 2015 UT App at ~ 16 (citing Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 
ct.App.1987». 
53 Puttuck v. Gendron, 2008 UT App 362, ~ 21,199 P.3d 971,978. 
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fraudulent statements, performing medically unnecessary closures at St. Mark's, falsifying 
records), and the damages (undergoing and paying for a medically unnecessary surgery and 
follow-up treatment). Ms. Bright identifies the underlying tort as fraud. 54 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Motions are granted in part and denied in part. 
With respect to the Sorensen Defendants, their Motion is GRANTED as to (a) the Second 
Claim for Relief (Negligence) because it is duplicative of the First Claim for Relief (Negligence 
- Malpractice) and (b) the Fifth Claim for Relief (Fraudulent Non-Disclosure/Concealment) 
because it is subsumed within other claims and/or she has failed to plead it with the requisite 
specificity. The Motion is DENIED as to all other claims against the Sorensen Defendants. 
With respect to St. Mark's, its Motion is GRANTED as to (a) the Second Claim for 
Relief (Negligence) because it is duplicative, (b) the Fourth Claim for Relief (Negligent 
Credentialing) because it is not recognized in Utah, and (c) the Third and Sixth Claims for Relief 
(Negligent Misrepresentation and Fraud) because Ms. Bright has not pled them with 
particularity. It is also GRANTED as to the Fifth Claim for Relief (Fraudulent Non-
Disclosure/Concealment) because it is subsumed within other claims and/or she has failed to 
plead it with partiCUlarity. The Motion is DENIED as to all other claims against St. Mark's. 
RULE 16 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
At counsel's convenience, they should contact the court's judicial team to schedule a 
Rule 16 scheduling conference to discuss a scheduling order and the status of the other pending 
cases. 
54 Although the court has dismissed the fraud claim against st. Mark's, this does not necessarily mean that a civil 
conspiracy claim based on a fraud also must be dismissed. See, e.g., Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 
(because defendant did not, by its own actions, defraud plaintiff or authorize another to do so, defendant's liability 
can only be established by proving that it was engaged in a conspiracy to defraud). 
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May 18, 2018 
The matter before the court is set for a ruling via telephone conference. 
Counsel and parties are present as listed. 
The Court presents findings regarding St. Marks Hospital and issues ruling on the 
record. 
1211 
The Court presents findings regarding Dr. Sherman Sorensen and issues ruling on the 
record. 
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1213 
The Court order Mr. Nolen to prepare and submit formal findings to the court. 
1214 
Court is in recess. 
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Following full briefing, this matter came before the Court for hearing and argument on 
May 1,2018. On May 18,2018, Rand Nolen, David Hobbs, and Rhome Zabriskie appeared on 
behalf of Plaintiff Pia Merlo-Schmucker; Eric Schoonveld and Drew Warth appeared on behalf 
of Defendant St. Mark's Hospital ("St. Mark's"); and Michael Miller and Kathleen Abke 
appeared on behalf of Defendants Sherman Sorensen and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group 
("Sorensen Defendants") for a telephonic ruling, which is reduced to writing here and is the 
Order of the Court. 
The matters before the Court are St. Mark's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint and the Sorensen Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. St. 
Mark's Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, and the 
Sorensen Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be DENIED. 
Both St. Mark's and the Sorensen Defendants moved to dismiss all claims in the 
Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b) on the grounds that all claims therein were barred by the 
four-year statute of repose found in 78B-3-404(1) and (2) of Utah's Medical Malpractice Act. 
Those provisions require that claims be brought within four-years of the date of the alleged act, 
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omISSIOn, neglect, or occurrence unless a patient has been prevented from discovering 
misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health care provider has 
affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct. 
It is not clear from the Amended Complaint whether any Defendant acted affirmatively 
within the meaning of the statute to fraudulently conceal anything. The word "affirmatively" was 
presumably and advisedly put into the statute-78B-3-404(1)-with meaning, and it appears to 
have a meaning different from the common law. Under the statute, some affirmative act of 
concealment is necessary to maintain an otherwise time-barred action. Defendants' argument 
that inaction or omission by a defendant is not sufficient to overcome the time bar appears to be 
well taken. 
That being said the Court is not convinced this issue is procedurally ripe at the Rule 12(b) 
stage and questions whether the Plaintiff is obligated to combat an affirmative defense, however 
likely or inevitably it is to be raised, in its initial pleading. 
The Defendants have presented cases that clearly indicate that the Court has discretion to 
address these issues under a 12(b) motion, however those cases are distinguishable in the Court's 
view. Roth v. Pederson was a judgment on the pleadings so the procedural context is similar, but, 
based on what the Court can tell from the opinion, the relevant allegations in the Roth complaint 
regarding fraudulent concealment were extremely sparse and entirely conclusory. 2009 UT App 
313,2009 WL 3490974 (unpublished). That is not the case here; the allegations have more detail 
and more substance than what was apparently pled in Roth. Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. is more on point than Roth as it was a Rule 12(b) motion, converted into a Rule 56 Motion. 
Tucker clearly gives a court discretion to entertain statute of limitations defenses in a motion to 
3 
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dismiss but did so under limited circumstances, which are not present here. 2002 UT 54, ~ 8, 53 
P.3d 947. In Tucker the plaintiff did not appear to offer any argument to counter the application 
of the statute of limitations and there did not appear to be any dispute as to whether it would 
have in fact barred the action, the plaintiff only argued that issue should not have be decided at 
that stage. It is a close call, but the Court feels the Plaintiff in this case has done enough to move 
her case into the next stage. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motions on the statute 
of limitationsirepose issue. 
Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff s fraud-based claims for failure to allege them 
with particularity as required by Rule 9( c). First, as to Plaintiff s claim for negligent 
misrepresentation, the Court finds the Amended Complaint contains no particular allegations as 
to misrepresentations made by St. Mark's Hospital. Similarly, Plaintiff s fraud and fraudulent 
concealment claims (as opposed to the exception to the statute of repose) also fail as to St. 
Mark's for failing to satisfy Rule 9(c). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS St. Mark's Hospital's 
motion and DISMISSES the negligent misrepresentation (Count III), fraudulent concealment 
(Count V), and fraud (Count VI) claims as to St. Mark's Hospital. As to the Sorensen 
Defendants, the Court finds the Amended Complaint alleges with particularity the fraud-based 
claims. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motions to dismiss the negligent misrepresentation, 
fraudulent concealment, and fraud claims as to the Sorensen Defendants. Further, the Court finds 
the Amended Complaint adequately alleges civil conspiracy and therefore DENIES the motions 
to dismiss the civil conspiracy (Count VII) claims as to all Defendants. 
The Sorensen Defendants further argue that all of Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed 
under the doctrine of claim preclusion due to the dismissal of the separate qui tam action, which 
4 
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involved claims by a relator under the federal False Claims Act. That dismissal is currently on 
appeal with the Tenth Circuit. I find that the issues in the qui tam and this action are not 
identical. Further, the parties are not identical, the parties are not in privity, and there has not 
been a final judgment in the qui tam action. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Sorensen 
Defendants' motion to dismiss all claims under the doctrine of claim preclusion. 
Finally, the Sorensen Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claims for negligence, negligent 
misrepresentation, fraud, and civil conspiracy are not cognizable as claims distinct from 
Plaintiff s medical negligence claim. While the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act does defme a 
malpractice action to include any action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, 
breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to 
or arising out of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care 
provider, it does so to identify the causes of action governed by the Act. But the Act does not 
foreclose a plaintiff from pleading different causes of action or create one omnibus cause of 
action. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Sorensen Defendants' motion. The Court's 
signature appears at the top of the first page of this order. 
***Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date 
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May 25, 2018 
Tape Number: W37 Tape Count: 10.33-11.04 
HEARING 
This is the time set for a Telephone Ruling. 
10.33 -The Court read its ruling on the record. The Court DENIED all of the Motions to 
Dismiss relating to the statute of limitations defense, but GRANTED IHC's Motion to 
dismiss the fraud claim(s) against it, and GRANTED Sorenson's motion to dismiss the 
Conspiracy claim for the reasons stated on the record. Mr. Nolan is to prepare the 
Order. 
After reading the Court's ruling, the parties discussed the manner in which to proceed. 
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At the conclusion of the discussion, the Court entered the following Scheduling Order: 
1. The Court would like to proceed with this matter as a bifurcated proceeding as 
allowable under the Medical Malpractice Act. 
2. The parties are to meet and confer by Friday June 8, 2018, to attempt to agree on a 
discovery plan relating to the statute of limitations issue only. The discovery plan 
should address the discovery mechanisms to be used and any limits in and and parameters 
of discovery. 
3. In the even the parties are unable to reach a stipulation, the parties will submit 
their respective proposed discovery plans to the ,Court by Friday June 22, 2018, after 
which the matter should be submitted for decision. The Court will then enter an Order 
stating the parameters of discovery based on its interpretation of the governing 
statute -- 78B-3-404 (2) (b) . 
4. The Court will hold off signing the Order on the Motion to Dismiss until it enters 
the Discovery Order. 
5. At that point, it might make sense for the parties to seek interlocutory relief 
regarding the Court's determination regarding the interpretation of the statute and 
resulting discovery order. 
End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page 
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May 25, 2018 
Tape Number: W37 Tape Count: 10.33-11.04 
HEARING 
This is the time set for a Telephone Ruling. 
10.33 -The Court read its ruling on the record. The Court DENIED all of the Motions to 
Dismiss relating to the statute of limitations defense, but GRANTED IHC's Motion to 
dismiss the fraud claim(s) against it, and GRANTED Sorenson's motion to dismiss the 
Conspiracy claim for the reasons stated on the record. Mr. Nolan is to prepare the 
Order. 
After reading the Court's ruling, the parties discussed the manner in which to proceed. 
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Case No: 170904956 Date: May 25, 2018 
At the conclusion of the discussion, the Court entered the following Scheduling Order: 
1. The Court would like to proceed with this matter as a bifurcated proceeding as 
allowable under the Medical Malpractice Act. 
2. The parties are to meet and confer by Friday June 8, 2018, to attempt to agree on a 
discovery plan relating to the statute of limitations issue only. The discovery plan 
should address the discovery mechanisms to be used and any limits in and and parameters 
of discovery. 
3. In the even the parties are unable to reach a stipulation, the parties will submit 
their respective proposed discovery plans to the Court by Friday June 22, 2018, after 
which the matter should be submitted for decision. The Court will then enter an Order 
stating the parameters of discovery based on its interpretation of the governing 
statute -- 78B-3-404 (2) (b) . 
4. The Court will hold off signing the Order on the Motion to Dismiss until it enters 
the Discovery Order. 
5. At that point, it might make sense for the parties to seek interlocutory relief 
regarding the Court's determination regarding the interpretation of the statute and 
resulting discovery order. 
End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page 
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This matter having come before the Court on May 25,2018 before the Honorable Judge 
Barry Lawrence. Rand Nolen, David Hobbs, and Rhome Zabriskie appeared on behalf of 
Plaintiff Lisa Tapp. Alan Bradshaw and Jack Nelson appeared on behalf of Defendant IHC 
Health Services, Inc., and Michael Miller and Kathleen Abke appeared on behalf of Defendants 
Sherman Sorensen and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group. The matter before the Court was a 
hearing on Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' amended complaint. 
The Court notes the relevant procedural history. After plaintiff filed her Complaint, a 
motion to dismiss was filed, followed by a request to file an amended complaint. On February 
20, 2018, the Court held argument on the motion to amend and rejected defendants' futility 
arguments in an Order dated March 7, 2018. After the Amended Complaint. was filed another 
set of motions to dismiss were filed; they were heard on May 14, 2018. The Court announced its 
ruling in a telephone conference on May 25, 2018. That ruling is reflected herein: but to the 
extent that ruling differs from this Order. the oral ruling should control. 
{01724935.RTF /2} 2 
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Having considered the motions, the Court dismisses the fraud/misrepresentation claims 
against IHC Health Services, Inc. and the conspiracy claim as to all Defendants. Other than that, 
the Court denies the motions, leaving the negligence claims against Dr. Sorensen, the negligence 
claims against IHC Health Services, Inc., and the fraud/misrepresentation claims against Dr. 
Sorensen. 
The Court concludes that it cannot rule on the statute of limitation/repose defense based 
on the pleadings. Plaintiff is not obligated to plead with particularity in her complaint facts in 
response to the statute of limitation/repose defense. The Plaintiff is not obligated to meet a 
heightened pleading requirement relating to facts that would serve to defeat an impending 
defense. Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Med. Ctr., Inc., 2005 UT App 325, ~ 6, 122 P.3d 891, 
893-94 ("the burden of pleading the inapplicability of [privilege] is not initially on the plaintiff, 
and it is not incumbent on the plaintiff or party filing a complaint to anticipate an affirmative 
defense which the answer may disclose"). 
The Court is not persuaded by the Defendants' argume~t to the contrary, and there is a 
distinction for cases where the complaint is "facially invalid" or untimely. The Court reads 
Defendants' cited cases as standing for the proposition that when all the facts necessary to 
determine an affirmative defense are stated in the complaint, then the affirmative defense can be 
resolved in a Rule 12 motion. That is not the case here where the facts of fraudulent concealment 
are not in the complaint and can't be unless the issue is before the Court in full. 
In Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, ~ 8, 53 P.3d 947, all of the 
{01724935.RTF / 2} 3 
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applicable dates were in the complaint and so the court ruled as a matter of law. There was no 
assertion of a defense to the defense of statute of limitation, and so it was not inappropriate for 
the court to rule. Again, it appears to the Court that all facts necessary to decide the Rule 12 
motion were in the complaint, which again is a far cry from this case. Van De Grift v. State, 2013 
UT 11,299 P.3d 1043 was dismissed on immunity grounds because there is immunity for claims 
that arise based on fraud and the complaint alleged facts of fraud. Bivens v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
2017 UT 67 involved exhaustion of remedies, which is a jurisdictional issue. There the complaint 
made clear that there was no exhaustion. And, in footnote the Bivens court said: "We do not hold 
today that a plaintiffs complaint must affirmatively plead exhaustion oflegal remedies." And in 
Lowery v. Brigham Young University, 2004 UT App 182, the complaint on its face reflected 
when the plaintiff discovered his claim, which meant that as a matter of law, the discovery rule 
could not apply and, therefore, the court could rule on the pleadings. None of these cases stand 
for the proposition that a plaintiff in the first instance has the obligation to state facts necessary 
to defeat a statute of limitations defense at all, let alone with a degree of patiicularity. The issue 
of whether the plaintiff can prove fraudulent concealment required under § 78B-3-404 will have 
to be based upon what we learn factually in discovery and to be decided at summary judgment or 
at trial. Accordingly, the Court DENIES all of the statute of limitations issues raised by the 
Defendants. 
The Sorensen Defendants argue that Plaintiff s claims should be consolidated into one 
medical malpractice claim. While the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act does have a broad 
definition of what a malpractice claim is for procedural purposes, the Court is not aware of any 
{Ol724935.RTF / 2} 4 
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authority that prevents a plaintiff from asserting alternative facts of fraud or negligence against 
Dr. Sorensen, and the elements of each would have to be proven at trial. However, the Court 
notes that it appears that there are multiple claims of negligence and multiple claims of fraud, 
and The Court will not dismiss those at this time. The plaintiff is certainly entitled to pursue its 
claims. But ultimately at trial, there will be one negligence claim against Dr. Sorensen and one 
fraud claim and if the standard of care encompasses various things that's fine, but those are not 
separate claims. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Sorensen Defendants' motion. 
IHC Health Services, Inc.' s motion to dismiss the misrepresentation claims is 
GRANTED. It is important to note that there is a distinction here between the fraud associated 
with the 2008 surgery and any alleged fraud that took place thereafter that is relevant to statute of 
limitation/repose. The allegations of IHC Health Services, Inc.'s fraud in inducing Ms. Tapp to 
have surgery are non-existent. There is nothing but conclusory statements where the plaintiff 
lumps the "defendants" in together and there is not one fact in the complaint that would support 
that IHC Health Services, Inc. was somehow involved in a fraud in 2008. There is no fact stated 
in the complaint that even alleges, let alone with any degree of particularity, as required under 
Rule 9, UR.C.P., that IHC Health Services, Inc. was involved in a fraud on Plaintiff in 2008. So 
that claim against IHC Health Services, Inc. is DISMISSED. The fraud claim against Dr. 
Sorensen will survive and the motion DENIED. There are ample allegations of facts supporting 
this fraudulent inducement theory in 2008 by Dr. Sorensen. But there is absolutely nothing 
demonstrating any fraud by IHC Health Services, Inc. or any sort of illegal conduct or wrong by 
IHC Health Services, Inc. and the predicate for a conspiracy claim has not been alleged. There 
{01724935.RTF / 2} 5 
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are no facts alleged against IHC Health Services, Inc. of fraud and conspiracy at the time the 
surgery was done. 
The conspiracy claim, like the fraud claims, is governed by Rule 9 and Rule 9 requires a 
showing of particularity. Williams v. State Farm, 656 P.2d 966 (1982); Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 
UT App 339, 79 P.3d 974 (2003); Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT App 19, 
344 P.3d 156. Having dismissed fraud claims against IHC Health Services, Inc. the Court is 
compelled to dismiss the conspiracy claim between the Defendants as well. (Having dismissed 
the underlying predicate for the conspiracy claim (i.e., the fraud claim), there can be no 
conspiracy claim as a matter of law.). The Court GRANTS Defendants' motions as to 
conspiracy and DISMISSES the conspiracy claim against all Defendants. 
In summary, the Court: 
GRANTS IHC Health Services, Inc.' s motion as to the misrepresentation claims and 
DISMISSES the Third; Fifth; and Sixth Claims for Relief against IHC Health Services, Inc.; 
GRANTS the Defendants' motions as to the conspiracy claim and DISMISSES the Seventh 
Claim for Relief against all Defendants; and otherwise 
DENIES the motions to dismiss. 
***Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date 
and seal at the top of the first page*** 
-------------------------------------------END ()If D()C1JMENT--------------------------------------------
Approved as to form: 
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM 
/s/ Jack T. Nelson (signed with permission on behalf of David Hobbs) 
David Hobbs 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR 
/s/ Jack T. Nelson 
Alan C. Bradshaw 
John T. (Jack) Nelson 
Attorneys for IHC Health Services, Inc. 
STRONG & HANNI 
/s/ Jack T. Nelson (signed with permission on behalf of Michael J. Miller) 
Michael J. Miller 
Attorneys for Sorensen Defendants 
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FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
(Tier 3 Filing) 
(Jury Demanded) 
Civil No. 170906790 
Judge: Laura Scott 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and hereby complain for causes of action 
against the above-captioned Defendants, alleging as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff Johannah Bright is, and at all relevant times has been, a resident of Davis 
County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D. was, at all relevant times, a licensed 
physician providing health care services in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
1 
00082 
3. Defendant SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR GROUP (SCG), was at all material 
times, a Utah professional corporation in the business of providing health care services to residents 
of Utah. Defendant SCG's principal place of business is located at 5169 Cottonwood Street, No. 
610, Murray, Utah. Defendant Sherman Sorensen owned and operated SCG as his primary medical 
practice. 
4. Defendant ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL. (St. Mark's) is a for-profit corporation based 
in Salt Lake City, Utah with its principal place of business and corporate office at 1200 E 3900 S 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124. St. Mark's Registered Agent for Service CT Corporation System, 1108 
E South Union Ave., Midvale UT 84047. 
5. Upon information and belief, at all material times, each of the Defendants were, or 
may have been, an agent, servant, employer, employee, joint venture, partner, and/or alter ego of 
one or more of each of the remaining Defendants, and were at all times acting within the purpose 
and scope of such agency, servitude, joint venture, alter ego, partnership, or employment, and with 
the authority, consent, approval, and/or ratification of each remaining Defendant. 
6. At all material times, Defendants were health care providers within the meaning of 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-401 et seq., and each Defendant 
provided health care services to Plaintiff. 
7. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-
102. 
8. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-307. 
9. In bringing this action, Plaintiff complied with all statutory requirements regarding 
pre-litigation review of this matter as set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code 




10. This case is one of more than a thousand cases that are presently working their way 
through the prelitigation process, which involve the medically unnecessary heart surgery by Dr. 
Sherman Sorensen related to two kinds of holes in the heart. One is called an atrial septal defect 
(ASD), and the other is a patent foramen ovale (PFO). Both are holes in the wall of tissue (septum) 
between the left and right upper chambers of the heart (atria). An ASD is considered a birth defect 
and is a failure of the septal tissue to form between the atria, PFOs can only occur after birth when 
the foramen ovale fails to close. 1 
11. Life threatening ASD' s are generally discovered at birth and corrected 
immediately. However, there are billions of adults who have small openings between the left and 
right atriums of their hearts. The foramen ovale is an opening located in the wall separating the 
two upper chambers of the heart, the atrial septum, which is used during fetal circulation to redirect 
blood through the heart. In 75% of the population, the foramen ovale closes at birth when increased 
blood pressure on the left side of the heart forces the opening to close. In those cases, where the 
foramen ovale does not close at birth, a patent foramen ovale (PFO) results. 
12. Approximately 25% of the healthy population have a PFO and will never require 
any treatment or evaluation. Apart from extremely rare cases, patients with a PFO remain 
completely unaware of the presence of the PFO because it's almost never associated with 
symptoms. Persistent patency of the foramen ovale is considered a normal anatomic variation. 
1 Dr. Sorensen at times earlier in his career referred to these two conditions interchangeably, but 
for insurance reimbursement purposes decided that all PFO's were ASD's later in his practice. 
Either way, and no matter what he called them, he closed holes indiscriminately and without 
medical justification on thousands of people, including the Plaintiff. 
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13. Only if a patient has a recurrence of cryptogenic (originating from unexplained 
causes) stroke or transient ischemic attack (TIA), likely due to paradoxical embolization through 
a PFO, and despite optimal medical therapy, may it be appropriate to close the PFO. Generally, 
this closure is performed through a percutaneous surgical procedure. In the percutaneous 
procedure, a patient undergoes a cardiac catheterization to determine the size and location of the 
PFO. 
14. There has long been general agreement in the medical community-as far back as 
2003-that PFO closure is not medically necessary, except in the limited circumstances where 
there is a confirmed diagnosis of a recurrent cryptogenic stroke or TIA, despite optimum medical 
management. At all material times, no widely accepted medical group specializing in cardiology 
in the United States has ever recommended, advised, or suggested that closure is appropriate for 
stroke or migraine prevention to patients that have not had recurrent cryptogenic strokes. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
15. The following general allegations are common to all claims alleged herein: 
16. As noted, Defendant Dr. Sorensen is a cardiologist and was practicing 
interventional cardiology. He had privileges at Defendant St. Mark's and at other hospitals. From 
roughly 2002 to 2012, Defendant Sorensen performed more than 4,000 PFO and ASD closures, 
many of those at St. Mark's. Dr. Sorensen performed the procedures at a rate that dwarfed the rest 
of the country by a factor of ten-to-twenty fold, making him a true outlier. 
17. The administration at St. Mark's was on notice because of the sheer volume of the 
procedures performed by Defendant Sorensen and because of complaints from other practitioners 
and employees that Defendant Sorensen was engaged in a practice of regularly performing 
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unnecessary, invasive cardiac procedures on his patients. St. Mark's ignored obvious warnings to 
halt these procedures so that it could secure and maintain a lucrative stream of income. 
18. Further, during the hiring and credentialing process at St. Mark's, Sorensen advised 
St. Mark's representatives of how he would perform closures and under what conditions. And a 
result, st. Mark's was aware that he would be performing unnecessary closures on patients that 
did not have recurrent cryptogenic strokes. 
19. Further, Sorensen's cardiac privileges at another hospital were suspended on or 
about June 27,2011, following an internal investigation concluded that Sorensen had performed 
multiple, medically unnecessary PFO closures and that Sorensen represented a threat to the health 
and safety of the patients treated. And St. Mark's CEO Steve Bateman and physician liaison Nikki 
Gledhill were aware of Sorensen's suspension. 
20. Defendants Sorensen and St. Mark's created false statements and documents to 
conceal the fact that Sorensen was performing medically unnecessary closures. These statements 
include documenting migraine or stroke history where none existed. For instance, Sorensen often 
created medical charts that falsely reflected that the patients had suffered from, or were at risk of 
suffering from, recurrent cryptogenic stroke in order to get insurance to pay for the procedure. The 
effort to disguise the true diagnosis and reason for the closures shows that Sorensen was always 
aware of and understood the true standard of care for these procedures. 
21. Sorensen would routinely mislead his patients, who had no previous strokes or 
TIAs, into believing that they were at extreme risk of debilitating stroke because of their PFO or 
ASD. He would further mislead them that a closure procedure would be effective and was 
medically necessary in order to prevent strokes. These misrepresentations were made to the vast 
majority of his patients, including Plaintiff. 
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22. Despite the fact that St. Mark's knew that Sorensen was performing medically 
unnecessary closures, and knew that Sorensen had been suspended for performing medically 
unnecessary closures at another hospital, St. Mark's Hospital continued to court Sorensen's 
business, provide a platform and assistance to Sorensen, and advertise and promote Sorensen and 
closure practice to the public for its own financial gain. 
23. In particular, the catheterization lab staff at St. Mark's became financially 
dependent on Sorensen's incredible volume. The majority of patients at St. Mark's cardiac 
catheterization laboratory came from Sorensen, dwarfing all other cardiology business at St. 
Mark's. As a result, St. Mark's provided special treatment to Sorensen with staffing and scheduling 
in its catheterization lab, often to the detriment of true cardiac patients and other cardiologists. St. 
Mark's also provided open access for PFO industry representatives to the lab and 
personnel. Industry provided order-in meals were available to those catheterization lab personnel 
that were willing to share in the largesse. 
24. Ultimately, St. Mark's made a deliberate and conscious decision not to inform 
patients that they may have had a medically unnecessary surgery, and chose not to reimburse 
Plaintiff, her insurance company, or any of its other patients who had procedures performed 
unnecessarily. Instead, St. Mark's kept the profits for itself. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLOSURE AND INJURIES 
25. On 9-21-07, Ms. Bright was seen in referral by Sorensen for migraine headaches 
and a transesophageal echocardiogram reported to show right to left shunting across the atrial 
septum. On 9-21-07, in Dr. Sorensen's office, Ms. Bright underwent a transthoracic 
echo cardiogram (TTE) with bubble study and a transcranial doppler study (TeD). The 
echo cardiogram was interpreted to show "severe rest and valsalva shunt by bubble study." The 
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TeD was interpreted to show conductance grade of 4/5 at rest and 5/5 with calibrated respiratory 
strain. Dr. Sorensen noted that the patient has described "minor palpitations." 
26. On 10-1-07, a brain MRI is performed at Western Neurological Associates. It was 
interpreted as "normal contrast-enhanced MRI of the brain." 
27. On 11-28-07, Ms. Bright was seen in office follow-up by Dr. Sorensen. He did not 
recommend closure of her septal defect: "The options for closure for stroke prevention [were] 
reviewed but she [did] not have risk stratification features other than migraine." Dr. Sorensen 
asked Ms. Bright to consider emolling in a randomized trial called the PREMIUM trial. That 
never occurred. 
28. On 11-4-09, a repeat consult was performed by Dr. Sorensen. Dr. Sorensen's 
neurologic exam on Ms. Bright was not comprehensive. For instance, it did not include a sensory 
exam. In the impression section of this history and physical, Dr. Sorensen dictated: "This woman 
has high risk features for stroke which include the presence of progressive migraine, moderately 
severe persistent shunting, severe Valsa1va shunting, and an interatrial septal aneurysm." This note 
was contrary to his previous note of 11-28-07 in which he dictated: "but she does not have risk 
stratification features other than migraine. " 
29. On 12-15-09, Dr. Sorensen performed an intracardiac echo-guided septal defect 
closure. He deployed a 20 mm Gore HELEX device. 
30. On 3-18-10, Ms. Bright underwent a TTE and a TeD in Dr. Sorensen's office. Both 
studies demonstrated the presence of a residual shunt. A bubble study during the echo cardiogram 
showed "mild right to left shunt at rest" and moderate right to left shunt" after va1salva. The TeD 
is interpreted to show a conductance grade of 2/5 at rest and 4/5 during calibrated respiratory 
strain. Dr. Sorensen's TeD reports gave slightly different guidelines for a "diagnostic TeD" 
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versus a "post-device TeD." In the diagnostic TeD, a conductance grade of 4/5 is termed a "mild 
to moderate" shunt with moderate probability for PFO, ASD, or AVM. There was a "low risk for 
stroke." In the post device TeD, a conductance grade of 4/5 is termed a "mild residual shunt." A 
conductance grade of 5 or 5+/5 in a post device TeD is termed a "significant residual shunt" and 
"further evaluation is indicated." 
31. On or about June 28, 2010, Ms. Bright had a 6 month follow TTE and TeD. These 
studies were interpreted to show a decrease in the magnitude of the residual shunt. The 
echocardiogram was interpreted to show no right to left shunt at rest and a mild right to left shunt 
with valsalva. The TeD was interpreted to show 115 conductance grade at rest and 3/5 
conductance grade with calibrated respiratory strain. The guidelines included in the TeD report 
indicates that a 3/5 conductance grade means "no significant shunt." 
32. The accepted indications for closure of an atrial septal defect include right 
ventricular chamber enlargement, orthodeoxia-platypnea, and paradoxical embolism. Ms. Bright 
did not have the first two. And, Dr. Sorensen failed to perform the appropriate assessment as to 
the last. 
33. In a patient with strong or definitive evidence for embolic stroke, the standard of 
care requires a comprehensive evaluation for all of the causes of embolic stroke. This was not 
performed by Dr. Sorensen in his care of Ms. Bright. A comprehensive evaluation for causes of 
"cryptogenic" stroke includes an MRI of the brain, imaging of the extra cranial and intracranial 
cerebral arteries, 3-4 week rhythm monitoring to look for paroxysmal atrial fibrillation, imaging 
of the aorta to look for atherosclerotic disease, lower extremity venous doppler/ultrasound, MRV 
of the abdominal and pelvic veins, and a hyper coagulability workup. Here, Dr. Sorensen did not 
meet this standard of care by, among other things, failing to give the details of alleged trans 
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ischemic attacks that Sorensen (not a neurologist) diagnosed, failing to get a neurology 
consultation, failing to have neuro-cognitive testing performed to document "cognitive decline," 
and failing to repeat a brain MRI to look for objective evidence of stroke. In short, Sorensen did 
not perform the required comprehensive evaluation. 
34. To persuade Ms. Bright to undergo closure, Sorensen represented to her that she 
was at high risk of a debilitating stroke due to the presence of her PFO/ ASD and that closure was 
medically necessary. In truth, the mere presence of the defect, without more, including a history 
of cryptogenic stroke, is not a significant risk factor for stroke. Further, Sorensen passed out a 
Patient Information Patent Foreman Ovale (PFO) handout to Ms. Bright. Sorensen's patient 
literature contained fraudulent misrepresentations, unsupported data and statistics, outright 
falsehoods, and other misleading statements, such as the following: 
• "Until recently, 40% of all strokes were unknown cause. We now know that most of 
these unexplained strokes may be caused by a PFO (Patent Foramen Ovale)" 
• "Strokes resulting from septal defects have a 50% mortality rate." 
• "PFO is diagnosed in 50-70% of patients with stroke of unknown cause" 
• "Continued lifelong risk of stroke ranging from 2-9% each year." 
• "Stroke reduction to less than 1 %" 
• "Septal Defect Closure Safety and Efficacy" 
• "Our rigorous Program requirements assure that you are informed and receive the safest 
and most effective treatment" 
In addition, to the handout Sorensen made other misrepresentations to Ms. Bright both orally and 
in writing. These misrepresentations include: 
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• "Our approach is a preventative strategy. It is scientifically based, but it is an 
aggressive strategy." In fact, Dr. Sorenson's method has never been accepted in any 
scientific journal, organization, been approved for a randomized clinical trial, andlor 
the peer review process for his data and proposed indication for PFO closure. "We, 
therefore follow a preventative strategy and risk stratify patients based on the 
studies ... proposed by the American Academy of Neurology." That is false; the AAN 
did not recommend closure outside of clinical trials and encouraged patients to 
participate in research protocols. 
• "8 studies demonstrate that very high flow is the main feature of stroke risk." In fact, 
the AAN Practice Parameter did not find an association, much less causation, of 
shunting and risk of stroke recurrence. 
• "Randomized trials are not available currently." In reality, the Closure I trial was 
opened in Salt Lake City, Utah. It was halted due to Defendant Sorensen's medically 
unnecessary off-label PFO procedures of patients outside the trial. 
• "Coumadin is considered to be unsafe and ineffective ... based on studies." In fact, the 
SPIRIT, W ASID and W ARRS studies referenced by Sorensen showed no such thing. 
• Sorenson certified that his echocardiography lab was certified by ICAEL (Intersocietal 
Commission for Accreditation Laboratories) using the ICAEL logo on his 
echochardiogram. In fact, his lab was never accredited by ICAEL and this was false. 
These false statements were intended to and did in fact induce Ms. Bright to undergo closure at St. 
Mark's by inducing fear of an imminent and debilitating stroke, downplaying safer and accepted 
treatment options, misrepresenting the indication for closure, and downplaying the risks of closure. 
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35. Despite St. Mark's awareness of Sorensen's fraudulent and/or negligent practices, 
it did nothing to notify Ms. Bright. Instead, St. Mark's actively allowed Sorensen's practice to 
continue in order to profit from the thousands of unnecessary procedures performed on patients 
like Ms. Bright. In fact, St. Mark's has to this day actively concealed its knowledge about 
Sorensen's rogue and fraudulent practices at its facility from patients, third party payers, and the 
public, and has retained the money earned off of Sorensen's medically unnecessary surgeries. 
36. Ms. Bright could not have known that the information provided by Defendants was 
false. Instead, she trusted that Defendants Sorensen and St. Mark's, as her health care providers, 
were being truthful. Further, even if she had been aware of some of the factual 
mischaracterizations, as a non-expert she could not have understood their implications as it relates 
the appropriateness of her medical treatment. 
37. Because of Defendants' fraudulent statements and omissions, Ms. Bright was until 
recently unaware of her cause of action. In fact, Ms. Bright only learned of the Defendants' 
misconduct as a result lawyer advertising. Her diligent investigation resulted in the noticing and 
filing of this action within the statutory period. 
38. Because of Defendants' conduct, Ms. Bright suffered significant damages, 
including: 
i. undergoing an unnecessary surgical procedure and hospital stay, 
11. paying significant medical expenses to Defendants, 
111. physical pain, and 
emotional anguish as a result of being told she was at immediate risk of a debilitating 
or even deadly stroke. 
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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE (HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE) 
39. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates th'e preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
40. Defendants, individually, collectively, and through the acts and omissions oftheir 
agents, servants, employees, physicians, nurses, therapists, and technologists (hereinafter 
collectively "Defendants") accepted Plaintiff as a patient, and thereby assumed various duties of 
care. 
41. At all relevant times, Defendants held themselves out as being able to provide full 
care and treatment for patients requiring medical care of the type that Plaintiff required. 
42. The degree of care and treatment provided to Plaintiff fell below the acceptable 
standards of care for the types of medical care and treatment required by Plaintiff and provided by 
Defendants. 
43. Specifically, Defendants breached the applicable standards of care in multiple ways 
including, but not limited to: 
a. Falsifying Plaintiff s medical records to indicate that Plaintiff was an appropriate 
candidate for closure; 
b. Misleading Plaintiff regarding the risks and benefits associated with closure and 
regarding the necessity of treatment; 
c. Failing to obtain an adequate history which resulted in an improper medical 
diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate candidate for closure; 
d. Failing to conduct an adequate physical and to obtain appropriate diagnostic testing, 
which resulted in an improper medical diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate 
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candidate for PFO closure; Performing a medically unnecessary medical procedure 
with a device that was not FDA approved for this use; and 
44. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omissions, 
Defendants caused Plaintiff to undergo unnecessary medical procedures, testing, and follow-up 
visits, incur unnecessary medical expenses, and experience physical injuries and emotional 
anguish. 
45. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omissions, 
Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including by not limited to unnecessary medical 
procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional anguish. 
46. Plaintiff has therefore been injured and is entitled to recover general and special 
damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE 
47. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
48. At all relevant times, Defendants owed Plaintiff various duties of care, including 
but not limited to common law and statutory duties. 
49. Defendants, individually and collectively, breached these duties of care. 
50. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omission, 
Defendants caused personal and other injuries to Plaintiff. 
51. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in 
amounts to be determined at trial. 
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
52. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
53. Defendants, individually and collectively, represented to Plaintiff that medical 
procedures, testing, and follow-up visits were medically necessary. 
54. Defendants' representations that Plaintiff's medical procedures, testing, and 
follow-up visits were medically necessary was, in fact, not true. 
55. Defendants failed to use reasonable care to determine whether the representations 
regarding the necessity of Plaintiff's medical care was true. 
56. Defendants were in a better position than Plaintiff to know the true facts regarding 
Plaintiff's medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care. 
57. Defendants had a financial interest in performing medically unnecessary 
procedures, testing, and follow-up care on Plaintiff. 
58. Plaintiffrelied on Defendants' representations, and it was reasonable for her to do 
so. 
59. Plaintiff has therefore been injured as a result of relying on Defendants' 
representations and is entitled to recover general and special damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING 




61. Defendant St. Mark's owes a duty to patients to exercise reasonable care in the 
selection of its medical staff and in granting specialized privileges to them. It also has the duty to 
periodically monitor and review the qualifications and competency of its medical staff. 
62. Defendant St. Mark's breached its duty to exercise reasonable care in its selection 
of its medical staff, and in granting specialized privileges to and periodically monitoring and 
reviewing the qualifications and competency of its medical staff. 
63. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of its breach, Defendant St. Mark's 
caused harm to Plaintiff. 
64. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in 
an amount to be determined at trial. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE/CONCEALMENT 
65. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
66. Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffto disclose important facts, such as the medical 
necessity of Plaintiffs medical care, to Plaintiff. 
67. Defendants knew that the medical care Defendants provided to Plaintiff was not 
medically necessary, and failed to disclose this to Plaintiff. 
68. Plaintiff did not know that the medical care provided by Defendants was not 
medically necessary. 
69. Defendants' failure to disclose the fact that Plaintiffs medical care was not 
necessary was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff s damages. Had Plaintiff known that her 
closure surgery was not necessary, Plaintiff would not have undergone the surgery. 
15 
00096 
70. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages 
in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUD 
71. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
72. At all relevant times, Defendants had a duty and obligation to disclose to Plaintiff 
true facts concerning the medical care provided to Plaintiff by Defendants. 
73. Defendants intentionally concealed material facts concerning Plaintiffs medical 
care from Plaintiff including, but not limited to the following: 
a. Falsifying Plaintiff s medical records to indicate that she was an appropriate 
candidate for closure; 
b. Performing medically unnecessary medical procedures with a device that was not 
FDA approved for this use; and 
c. Concealing from Plaintiff that medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care was 
unnecessary. 
74. Defendants made false statements and misrepresentations about important facts 
regarding Plaintiff s medical care. 
75. Defendants made these false statements and misrepresentations described above 
knowing that the statements were false, or with reckless disregard for their truth. 
76. Defendants made the false statements and misrepresentations to Plaintiff, with the 
intent that Plaintiff would rely on the statements. 




78. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' false statements and 
misrepresentations, Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including but not limited to 
unnecessary medical procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional 
anguish. 
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: CIVIL CONSPIRACY 
79. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
80. Defendants were acting in a conspiracy to commit fraud, thereby increasing their 
profits through the performance of medically unnecessary procedures on patients, including 
Plaintiff. 
81. There was an agreement and meeting of the minds among Defendant Sorensen, 
Defendant SCG, and Defendant St. Mark's to misrepresent the need for and induce patients, 
including Plaintiff, into undergoing medically unnecessary procedures, testing, and follow-up. 
Defendants agreed to act in concert in making these misrepresentations about the necessity of 
medical procedures to Plaintiff. 
82. There were multiple unlawful, overt acts by Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SCG, 
and Defendant St. Mark's in furtherance of their scheme, including without limitation, Defendants' 
fraud. 
83. As a result of this conspiracy, Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SCG, and Defendant 
St. Mark's, should be held jointly and severally liable for the conduct of the other co-conspirators 
and the damages that Plaintiff sustained as a proximate result thereof, including without limitation 
personal injuries and other injuries. 
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84. Plaintiff would further show that Defendant Sorensen and Defendant SCG were 
operating as alter egos for the purpose of perpetrating the above described conspiracy. There was 
such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the company and the 
individual did not exist. Observing the corporate form will sanction this conspiracy, promote 
injustice, and allow an inequitable result. 
EOUITABLE TOLLINGIFRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT 
85. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
86. Because of Defendants' concealment of material facts and misleading conduct, 
Plaintiff was not aware of her causes of action. 
87. Defendants took affirmative steps to conceal Plaintiffs cause of action. Given 
Defendants' concealment and misleading conduct, a reasonable plaintiff would not have 
discovered the cause of action earlier. 
88. Neither Sorenson, nor St. Mark's ever notified Plaintiff that she had received an 
unnecessary procedure, that she was never indicated for the surgery to begin with, that the device 
implanted into Plaintiff was never medically necessary, was retained in her body for no medical 
purpose, and that the informed consent contained fraudulent, misleading, and/or incomplete 
statements. Neither Sorenson, nor St. Mark's, ever compensated Plaintiff for the unnecessary 
medical surgery she underwent by reimbursing the costs of the procedure. 
89. Neither Sorensen, nor St. Mark's, ever made a public statement, sent a letter, made 
a public announcement, or issued a press release to inform patients, such as Plaintiff, that they may 
have had medically unnecessary closures. 
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90. Defendants' misrepresentations and misleading conduct constitutes fraudulent 
concealment that tolls any proffered statute of limitation that may otherwise bar the recovery 
sought by Plaintiff. 
91. Plaintiff did not know, nor should have known, of the causes of action against 
Defendants prior to being put on notice of Defendants' potential liability recently. She neither 
discovered, nor reasonably should have discovered, the facts underlying her causes of action before 
any proffered statute of limitations period expired. 
92. As a result of Defendants' concealment of the true character, quality and nature of 
their conduct, they are estopped from relying on any statute of limitations defense. Defendants' 
affirmative acts and omissions, before, during, and/or after their actions causing Plaintiffs injury 
prevented Plaintiff from discovering the injury or cause thereof until recently. Such conduct tolls 
the limitations pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 78B-3-404(b). 
93. Defendants' conduct, because it was purposely committed, was known or should 
have been known by them to be dangerous, heedless, reckless, and without regard to the 
consequences or the rights and safety of Plaintiff. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a jUdgment (under URCP: Tier 3) against Defendants in an 
amount to be determined by the trier of fact for the following damages: 
a. For special damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 
b. For general damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 
c. For pre and post judgment interest on all special damages pursuant to Utah law; 
d. For costs and attorney fees to the extent allowed by law; and 
e. For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of December 2017. 
lsi Rhome D. Zabriskie 
Rhome D. Zabriskie 
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC 
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Tel: (801) 375-7680 
Fax: (801) 375-7686 
Email: rhomelawyer@yahoo.com 
FLEMING, NOLEN & JEZ, LLP 
Rand P. Nolen (Pro Hac Vice submission in 
progress) 
David L. Hobbs (Pro Hac Vice submission in 
progress) 
2800 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 4000 
Houston, TX 77056-6109 
Telephone: (713) 621-7944 
Facsimile: (713) 621-9638 
Email: rand_nolen@f1eming-Iaw.com 
Email: davidjIobbs@f1eming-law.com 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that that a true and exact copy of the foregoing has been served on the following 
via the Court's ECF filing system and/or Email on 21st day of December, 2017: 
Eric P. Schoonveld 
Tawni J. Anderson 
NathanE. Dorsey 
Hall Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC 
111 East Broadway, Suite 700 






Attorneysfor St. Mark's Hospital 
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Michael J. Miller 
Strong & Hanni 
102 South 200 East, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
mmiller@strongandhanni.com 
Attorney for Defendants Sherman Sorensen, MD. and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group 
/s/ Rhome D. Zabriskie 
Rhome D. Zabriskie 
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Rhome D. Zabriskie 
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC 
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Tel: (801) 375-7680 
Fax: (801) 375-7686 
Email: rhomelawyer@yahoo.com 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY 
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FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
(Tier 3 Filing) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D.; 
SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR 
GROUP; AND ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL, 
Defendants. 
(Jury Demanded) 
Civil No. 170906130 
Judge Matthew Bates 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and hereby complain for causes of action 
against the above-captioned Defendants, alleging as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff Pia Merlo-Schmucker is, and at all relevant times has been, a resident of 
Davis County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D. was, at all relevant times, a licensed 
physician providing health care services in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
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3. Defendant SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR GROUP CSCG), was at all material 
times, a Utah professional corporation in the business of providing health care services to residents 
of Utah. Defendant SCG's principal place of business is located at 5169 Cottonwood Street, No. 
610, Murray, Utah. Defendant Sherman Sorensen owned and operated SCG as his primary medical 
practice. 
4. Defendant ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL. CSt. Mark's) is a for-profit corporation based 
in Salt Lake City, Utah with its principal place of business and corporate office at 1200 E 3900 S 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124. St. Mark's Registered Agent for Service CT Corporation System, 1108 
E South Union Ave., Midvale UT 84047. 
5. Upon information and belief, at all material times, each of the Defendants were, or 
may have been, an agent, servant, employer, employee, joint venture, partner, and/or alter ego of 
one or more of each of the remaining Defendants, and were at all times acting within the purpose 
and scope of such agency, servitude, joint venture, alter ego, partnership, or employment, and with 
the authority, consent, approval, and/or ratification of each remaining Defendant. 
6. At all material times, Defendants were health care providers within the meaning of 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-401 et seq., and each Defendant 
provided health care services to Pia Merlo-Schmucker. 
7. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-
102. 
8. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-307. 
9. In bringing this action, Plaintiff complied with all statutory requirements regarding 
pre-litigation review of this matter as set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code 




10. This case is one of more than a thousand cases that are presently working their way 
through the prelitigation process, which involve the medically unnecessary heart surgery by Dr. 
Sherman Sorensen related to two kinds of holes in the heart. One is called an atrial septal defect 
(ASD), and the other is a patent foramen ovale (PFO). Both are holes in the wall of tissue (septum) 
between the left and right upper chambers of the heart (atria). An ASD is considered a birth defect 
and is a failure of the septal tissue to form between the atria, PFOs can only occur after birth when 
the foramen ovale fails to close. 1 
11. Life threatening ASD's are generally discovered at birth and corrected 
immediately. However, there are billions of adults who have small openings between the left and 
right atriums of their hearts. The foramen ovale is an opening located in the wall separating the 
two upper chambers of the heart, the atrial septum, which is used during fetal circulation to redirect 
blood through the heart. In 75% of the population, the foramen ovale closes at birth when increased 
blood pressure on the left side of the heart forces the opening to close. In those cases, where the 
foramen ovale does not close at birth, a patent foramen ovale (PFO) results. 
12. Approximately 25% of the healthy population have a PFO and will never require 
any treatment or evaluation. Apart from extremely rare cases, patients with a PFO remain 
completely unaware of the presence of the PFO because it's almost never associated with 
symptoms. Persistent patency of the foramen ovale is considered a normal anatomic variation. 
1 Dr. Sorensen at times earlier in his career referred to these two conditions interchangeably, but 
for insurance reimbursement purposes decided that all PFO's were ASD's later in his practice. 
Either way, and no matter what he called them, he closed holes indiscriminately and without 
medical justification on thousands of people, including the Plaintiff. 
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13. Only if a patient has a recurrence of cryptogenic (originating from unexplained 
causes) stroke or transient ischemic attack (TIA), likely due to paradoxical embolization through 
a PFO, and despite optimal medical therapy, may it be appropriate to close the PFO. Generally, 
this closure is performed through a percutaneous surgical procedure. In the percutaneous 
procedure, a patient undergoes a cardiac catheterization to determine the size and location of the 
PFO. 
14. There has long been general agreement in the medical community-as far back as 
2003-that PFO closure is not medically necessary, except in the limited circumstances where 
there is a confirmed diagnosis of a recurrent cryptogenic stroke or TIA, despite optimum medical 
management. At all material times, no widely accepted medical group specializing in cardiology 
in the United States has ever recommended, advised, or suggested that closure is appropriate for 
stroke or migraine prevention to patients that have not had recurrent crypotogenic strokes. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
15. The following general allegations are common to all claims alleged herein: 
16. As noted, Defendant Dr. Sorensen is a cardiologist and was practicing 
interventional cardiology. He had privileges at Defendant St. Mark's and at other hospitals. From 
roughly 2002 to 2012, Defendant Sorensen performed more than 4,000 PFO and ASD closures, 
many of those at St. Mark's. Dr. Sorensen performed the procedures at a rate that dwarfed the rest 
of the country by a factor often-to-twenty fold, making him a true outlier. 
17. The administration at St. Mark's was on notice because of the sheer volume of the 
procedures performed by Defendant Sorensen and because of complaints from other practitioners 
and employees that Defendant Sorensen was engaged in a practice of regularly performing 
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unnecessary, invasive cardiac procedures on his patients. St. Mark's ignored obvious warnings to 
halt these procedures so that it could secure and maintain a lucrative stream of income. 
18. Further, during the hiring and credentialing process at St. Mark's, Sorensen advised 
St. Mark's representatives of how he would perform closures and under what conditions. And a 
result, St. Mark's was aware that he would be performing unnecessary closures on patients that 
did not have recurrent cryptogenic strokes. 
19. Further, Sorensen's cardiac privileges at another hospital were suspended on or 
about June 27, 2011, following an internal investigation concluded that Sorensen had performed 
multiple, medically unnecessary PFO closures and that Sorensen represented a threat to the health 
and safety of the patients treated. And St. Mark's CEO Steve Bateman and physician liaison Nikki 
Gledhill were aware of Sorensen's suspension. 
20. Defendants Sorensen and St. Mark's created false statements and documents to 
conceal the fact that Sorensen was performing medically unnecessary closures. These statements 
include documenting migraine or stroke history where none existed. For instance, Sorensen often 
created medical charts that falsely reflected that the patients had suffered from, or were at risk of 
suffering from, recurrent cryptogenic stroke in order to get insurance to pay for the procedure. The 
effort to disguise the true diagnosis and reason for the closures shows that Sorensen was always 
aware of and understood the true standard of care for these procedures. 
21. Sorensen would routinely mislead his patients, who had no previous strokes or 
TIAs, into believing that they were at extreme risk of debilitating stroke because of their PFO or 
ASD. He would further mislead them that a closure procedure would be effective and was 
medically necessary in order to prevent strokes. These misrepresentations were made to the vast 
majority of his patients, including Plaintiff. 
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22. Despite the fact that St. Mark's knew that Sorensen was performing medically 
unnecessary closures, and knew that Sorensen had been suspended for performing medically 
unnecessary closures at another hospital, St. Mark's Hospital continued to court Sorensen's 
business, provide a platform and assistance to Sorensen, and advertise and promote Sorensen and 
closure practice to the public for its own financial gain. 
23. In particular, the catheterization lab staff at St. Mark's became financially 
dependent on Sorensen's incredible volume. The majority of patients at St. Mark's cardiac 
catheterization laboratory came from Sorensen, dwarfing all other cardiology business at St. 
Mark's. As a result, St. Mark's provided special treatment to Sorensen with staffing and scheduling 
in its catheterization lab, often to the detriment of true cardiac patients and other cardiologists. St. 
Mark's also provided open access for PFO industry representatives to the lab and 
personnel. Industry provided order-in meals were available to those catheterization lab personnel 
that were willing to share in the largesse. 
24. Ultimately, St. Mark's made a deliberate and conscious decision not to inform 
patients that they may have had a medically unnecessary surgery, and chose not to reimburse 
Plaintiff, her insurance company, or any of its other patients who had procedures performed 
unnecessarily. Instead, St. Mark's kept the profits for itself. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLOSURE AND INJURIES 
25. On December 21,2010, a transthoracic echocardiogram (TTE) was performed on 
Ms. Merlo-Schmucker in Dr. Sorensen's office. Medical records indicate that the patient was 
referred by Tyler Williams MD and that the indication is cognitive changes and a murmur. A 
transcranial doppler study (TeD) is performed as well. The echocardiogram was interpreted to 
6 
00101 
show "severe right to left shunt after valsalva." The TeD study was interpreted to show 5+/5 
conductance with calibrated respiratory strain." 
26. On December 28, 2010, a brain MRI was performed at Western Neurological 
Associates. This did not conclusively demonstrate evidence of a previous stroke. A "tiny 
nonspecific focus of flair sequence hyperintensity" is described. A differential diagnosis is given 
that includes "embolic disease." But the radiologist also dictates "imaging artifact is not entirely 
excluded." 
27. On February 10,2011, a percutaneous closure of a septal defect was accomplished 
using a 25 mm Gore HELEX ASD device. This was guided by intracardiac echo. Dr. Sorensen 
referred to the septal defect as an atrial septal defect. Following deployment of the device, color 
flow doppler showed no left to right flow and a contrast bubble study was negative for right to left 
shunting. 
28. On February 11, 2011, pnor to discharge from St. Mark's, a transthoracic 
echocardiogram was performed. The report states that color flow doppler "does not demonstrate 
a residual shunt," but a bubble study was not performed. 
29. The accepted indications for closure of an atrial septal defect include right 
ventricular chamber enlargement, which was not seen on Ms. Merlo-Schmucker's 
echocardiograms, orthodeoxia-platypnea, which was not described by Dr. Sorensen, and 
paradoxical embolism. 
30. In a patient with strong or definitive evidence for embolic stroke, the standard of 
care requires a comprehensive evaluation for all of the causes of embolic stroke. This was not 
performed by Dr. Sorensen in his care of Ms. Merlo-Schmucker. A comprehensive evaluation for 
causes of "cryptogenic" stroke includes an MRI ofthe brain (which was done in this case), imaging 
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of the extra cranial and intracranial cerebral arteries, 3-4 week rhythm monitoring to look for 
paroxysmal atrial fibrillation, imaging of the aorta to look for atherosclerotic disease, lower 
extremity venous doppler/ultrasound, MRV of the abdominal and pelvic veins, and a hyper 
coagulability workup. But Sorensen did not perform the required comprehensive evaluation. 
31. To persuade Plaintiff to undergo closure, Defendant Sorensen represented to 
Plaintiff that she was at high risk of a debilitating stroke due to the presence of her PFO/ ASD and 
that closure was medically necessary. In truth, the mere presence of the defect, without more, 
including a history of cryptogenic stroke, is not a significant risk factor for stroke. Further, 
Sorensen passed out a Patient Information Patent Foreman Ovale (PFO) handout to Plaintiff. 
Sorensen's patient literature contained fraudulent misrepresentations, unsupported data and 
statistics, outright falsehoods, and other misleading statements, such as the following: 
• "Until recently, 40% of all strokes were unknown cause. We now know that most of 
these unexplained strokes may be caused by a PFO (Patent Foramen Ovale)" 
• "Strokes resulting from septal defects have a 50% mortality rate." 
• "PFO is diagnosed in 50-70% of patients with stroke of unknown cause" 
• "Continued lifelong risk of stroke ranging from 2-9% each year." 
• "Stroke reduction to less than 1 %" 
• "Septal Defect Closure Safety and Efficacy" 
• "Our rigorous Program requirements assure that you are informed and receive the safest 
and most effective treatment" 
In addition, to the handout Sorensen made other misrepresentations to Plaintiff both in orally and 
in writing. These misrepresentations include: 
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• "Our approach is a preventative strategy. It is scientifically based, but it is an 
aggressive strategy." In fact, Dr. Sorenson's method has never been accepted in any 
scientific journal, organization, been approved for a randomized clinical trial, andlor 
the peer review process for his data and proposed indication for PFO closure. "We, 
therefore follow a preventative strategy and risk stratify patients based on the 
studies ... proposed by the American Academy of Neurology." That is false; the AAN 
did not recommend closure outside of clinical trials and encouraged patients to 
participate in research protocols. 
• "8 studies demonstrate that very high flow is the main feature of stroke risk." In fact, 
the AAN Practice Parameter did not find an association, much less causation, of 
shunting and risk of stroke recurrence. 
• "Randomized trials are not available currently." In reality, the Closure I trial was 
opened in Salt Lake City, Utah. It was halted due to Defendant Sorensen's medically 
unnecessary off-label PFO procedures of patients outside the trial. 
• "Coumadin is considered to be unsafe and ineffective ... based on studies." In fact, the 
SPIRIT, W ASID and W ARRS studies referenced by Sorensen showed no such thing. 
• Defendant Sorenson certified that his echo cardiography lab was certified by ICAEL 
(Intersocietal Commission for Accreditation Laboratories) using the ICAEL logo on 
his echochardiogram. In fact, his lab was never accredited by ICAEL and this was 
false. 
These false statements were intended to and did in fact induce Plaintiff to undergo closure at St. 
Mark's by inducing fear of an imminent and debilitating stroke, downplaying safer and accepted 
treatment options, misrepresenting the indication for closure, and downplaying the risks of closure. 
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32. Despite St. Mark's awareness of Sorensen's fraudulent and/or negligent practices, 
it did nothing to notify Ms. Merlo-Schmucker. Instead, st. Mark's actively allowed Sorensen's 
practice to continue in order to profit from the thousands of unnecessary procedures performed on 
patients like Ms. Merlo-Schmucker. In fact, St. Mark's has to this day actively concealed its 
knowledge about Sorensen's rogue and fraudulent practices at its facility from patients, third party 
payers, and the public, and has retained the money earned off of Sorensen's medically unnecessary 
surgenes. 
33. Plaintiff could not have known that the information provided by Defendants was 
false. Instead, she trusted that Defendants Sorensen and St. Mark's, as her health care providers, 
were being truthful. Further, even if she had been aware of some of the factual 
mischaracterizations, as a non-expert she could not have understood their implications as it relates 
the appropriateness of her medical treatment. 
34. Because of Defendants' fraudulent statements and omissions, Plaintiff was until 
recently unaware of her cause of action. In fact, Plaintiff only learned of the Defendants' 
misconduct as a result lawyer advertising. Her diligent investigation resulted in the noticing and 
filing of this action within the statutory period. 
35. Because of Defendants , conduct, Plaintiff suffered significant damages, including: 
1. undergoing an unnecessary surgical procedure and hospital stay, 
ii. paying significant medical expenses to Defendants, 
iii. physical pain, and 
emotional anguish as a result of being told she was at immediate risk of a debilitating 
or even deadly stroke. 
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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE (HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE) 
36. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
37. Defendants, individually, collectively, and through the acts and omissions of their 
agents, servants, employees, physicians, nurses, therapists, and technologists (hereinafter 
collectively "Defendants") accepted Plaintiff as a patient, and thereby assumed various duties of 
care. 
38. At all relevant times, Defendants held themselves out as being able to provide full 
care and treatment for patients requiring medical care of the type that Plaintiff required. 
39. The degree of care and treatment provided to Plaintiff fell below the acceptable 
standards of care for the types of medical care and treatment required by Plaintiff and provided by 
Defendants. 
40. Specifically, Defendants breached the applicable standards of care in multiple ways 
including, but not limited to: 
a. Falsifying Plaintiff s medical records to indicate that Plaintiff was an appropriate 
candidate for closure; 
b. Misleading Plaintiff regarding the risks and benefits associated with closure and 
regarding the necessity of treatment; 
c. Failing to obtain an adequate history which resulted in an improper medical 
diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate candidate for closure; 
d. Failing to conduct an adequate physical and to obtain appropriate diagnostic testing, 
which resulted in an improper medical diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate 
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candidate for PFO closure; Perfonning a medically unnecessary medical procedure 
with a device that was not FDA approved for this use; and 
41. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omissions, 
Defendants caused Plaintiff to undergo unnecessary medical procedures, testing, and follow-up 
visits, incur unnecessary medical expenses, and experience physical injuries and emotional 
anguish. 
42. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omissions, 
Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including by not limited to unnecessary medical 
procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional anguish. 
43. Plaintiff has therefore been injured and is entitled to recover general and special 
damages in an amount to be determined at tria1. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE 
44. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
45. At all relevant times, Defendants owed Plaintiff various duties of care, including 
but not limited to common law and statutory duties. 
46. Defendants, individually and collectively, breached these duties of care. 
47. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omission, 
Defendants caused personal and other injuries to Plaintiff. 
48. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in 
amounts to be detennined at tria1. 
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
49. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
50. Defendants, individually and collectively, represented to Plaintiff that medical 
procedures, testing, and follow-up visits were medically necessary. 
51. Defendants' representations that Plaintiff s medical procedures, testing, and 
follow-up visits were medically necessary was, in fact, not true. 
52. Defendants failed to use reasonable care to determine whether the representations 
regarding the necessity of Plaintiffs medical care was true. 
53. Defendants were in a better position than Plaintiff to know the true facts regarding 
Plaintiffs medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care. 
54. Defendants had a fmancial interest m performing medically unnecessary 
procedures, testing, and follow-up care on Plaintiff. 
55. Plaintiff relied on Defendants' representations, and it was reasonable for her to do 
so. 
56. Plaintiff has therefore been injured as a result of relying on Defendants' 
representations and is entitled to recover general and special damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING 




58. Defendant St. Mark's owes a duty to patients to exercise reasonable care in the 
selection of its medical staff and in granting specialized privileges to them. It also has the duty to 
periodically monitor and review the qualifications and competency of its medical staff. 
59. Defendant St. Mark's breached its duty to exercise reasonable care in its selection 
of its medical staff, and in granting specialized privileges to and periodically monitoring and 
reviewing the qualifications and competency of its medical staff. 
60. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of its breach, Defendant St. Mark's 
caused harm to Plaintiff. 
61. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in 
an amount to be determined at trial. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUDULANT NON-DISCLOSURE/CONCEALMENT 
62. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
63. Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff to disclose important facts, such as the medical 
necessity of Plaintiff s medical care, to Plaintiff. 
64. Defendants knew that the medical care Defendants provided to Plaintiff was not 
medically necessary, and failed to disclose this to Plaintiff. 
65. Plaintiff did not know that the medical care provided by Defendants was not 
medically necessary. 
66. Defendants' failure to disclose the fact that Plaintiffs medical care was not 
necessary was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff s damages. Had Plaintiff known that her 
closure surgery was not necessary, Plaintiff would not have undergone the surgery. 
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67. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages 
in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUD 
68. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
69. At all relevant times, Defendants had a duty and obligation to disclose to Plaintiff 
true facts concerning the medical care provided to Plaintiff by Defendants. 
70. Defendants intentionally concealed material facts concerning Plaintiffs medical 
care from Plaintiff including, but not limited to the following: 
a. Falsifying Plaintiffs medical records to indicate that she was an appropriate 
candidate for closure; 
b. Performing medically unnecessary medical procedures with a device that was not 
FDA approved for this use; and 
c. Concealing from Plaintiff that medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care was 
unnecessary. 
71. Defendants made false statements and misrepresentations about important facts 
regarding Plaintiffs medical care. 
72. Defendants made these false statements and misrepresentations described above 
knowing that the statements were false, or with reckless disregard for their truth. 
73. Defendants made the false statements and misrepresentations to Plaintiff, with the 
intent that Plaintiff would rely on the statements. 




75. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' false statements and 
misrepresentations, Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including but not limited to 
unnecessary medical procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional 
anguish. 
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: CIVIL CONSPIRACY 
76. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
77. Defendants were acting in a conspiracy to commit fraud, thereby increasing their 
profits through the performance of medically unnecessary procedures on patients, including 
Plaintiff. 
78. There was an agreement and meeting of the minds among Defendant Sorensen, 
Defendant SCG, and Defendant St. Mark's to misrepresent the need for and induce patients, 
including Plaintiff, into undergoing medically unnecessary procedures, testing, and follow-up. 
Defendants agreed to act in concert in making these misrepresentations about the necessity of 
medical procedures to Plaintiff. 
79. There were multiple unlawful, overt acts by Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SCG, 
and Defendant St. Mark's in furtherance of their scheme, including without limitation, Defendants' 
fraud. 
80. As a result of this conspiracy, Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SCG, and Defendant 
st. Mark's, should be held jointly and severally liable for the conduct of the other co-conspirators 
and the damages that Plaintiff sustained as a proximate result thereof, including without limitation 
personal injuries and other injuries. 
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81. Plaintiff would further show that Defendant Sorensen and Defendant SeG were 
operating as alter egos for the purpose of perpetrating the above described conspiracy. There was 
such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the company and the 
individual did not exist. Observing the corporate form will sanction this conspiracy, promote 
injustice, and allow an inequitable result. 
EOUITABLE TOLLINGIFRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT 
82. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
83. Because of Defendants' concealment of material facts and misleading conduct, 
Plaintiff was not aware of her causes of action. 
84. Defendants took affirmative steps to conceal Plaintiff's cause of action. Given 
Defendants' concealment and misleading conduct, a reasonable plaintiff would not have 
discovered the cause of action earlier. 
85. Neither Sorenson, nor St. Mark's ever notified Plaintiff that she had received an 
unnecessary procedure, that she was never indicated for the surgery to begin with, that the device 
implanted into Plaintiff was never medically necessary, was retained in her body for no medical 
purpose, and that the informed consent contained fraudulent, misleading, and/or incomplete 
statements. Neither Sorenson, nor St. Mark's, ever compensated Plaintiff for the unnecessary 
medical surgery she underwent by reimbursing the costs of the procedure. 
86. Neither Sorensen, nor St. Mark's, ever made a public statement, sent a letter, made 
a public announcement, or issued a press release to inform patients, such as Plaintiff, that they may 
have had medically unnecessary closures. 
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87. Defendants' misrepresentations and misleading conduct constitutes fraudulent 
concealment that tolls any proffered statute of limitation that may otherwise bar the recovery 
sought by Plaintiff. 
88. Plaintiff did not know, nor should have known, of the causes of action against 
Defendants prior to being put on notice of Defendants' potential liability recently. She neither 
discovered, nor reasonably should have discovered, the facts underlying her causes of action before 
any proffered statute of limitations period expired. 
89. As a result of Defendants' concealment of the true character, quality and nature of 
their conduct, they are estopped from relying on any statute of limitations defense. Defendants' 
affIrmative acts and omissions, before, during, andlor after their actions causing Plaintiffs injury 
prevented Plaintiff from discovering the injury or cause thereof until recently. Such conduct tolls 
the limitations pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 78B-3-404(b). 
90. Defendants' conduct, because it was purposely committed, was known or should 
have been known by them to be dangerous, heedless, reckless, and without regard to the 
consequences or the rights and safety of Plaintiff. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgment (under URCP: Tier 3) against Defendants in an 
amount to be determined by the trier of fact for the following damages: 
a. For special damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 
b. For general damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 
c. For pre and post judgment interest on all special damages pursuant to Utah law; 
d. For costs and attorney fees to the extent allowed by law; and 
e. For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of December 2017. 
lsi Rhome D. Zabriskie 
Rhome D. Zabriskie 
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC 
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Tel: (801) 375-7680 
Fax: (801) 375-7686 
Email: rhomelawyer@yahoo.com 
FLEMING, NOLEN & JEZ, LLP 
Rand P. Nolen (Pro Hac Vice submission in 
progress) 
David L. Hobbs (Pro Hac Vice submission in 
progress) 
2800 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 4000 
Houston, TX 77056-6109 
Telephone: (713) 621-7944 
Facsimile: (713) 621-9638 
Email: rand_nolen@f1eming-law.com 
Email: david_hobbs@f1eming-law.com 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that that a true and exact copy of the foregoing has been served on the following 
via the Court's ECF filing system andlor Email on 14th day of December, 2017: 
Eric P. Schoonveld 
Tawni J. Anderson 
Nathan E. Dorsey 
Hall Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC 
111 East Broadway, Suite 700 






Attorneys for St. Mark's Hospital 
Michael J. Miller 
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Strong & Hanni 
102 South 200 East, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
mmiller@strongandhanni.com 
Attorney for Defendants Sherman Sorensen, MD. and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group 
/s/ Rhome D. Zabriskie 
Rhome D. Zabriskie 
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Rhome D. Zabriskie 
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC 
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Tel: (801) 375-7680 
Fax: (801) 375-7686 
Email: rhome1awyer@yahoo.com 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 







SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D.; ) 
SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR ) 




FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
(Tier 3 Filing) 
(Jury Demanded) 
Case No. 170904956 
Judge Barry Lawrence 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and hereby complain for causes of action 
against the above-captioned Defendants, alleging as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff Lisa Tapp is, and at all relevant times has been, a resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
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2. Defendant SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D. was, at all relevant times, a licensed 
physician providing health care services in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. Defendant SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR GROUP (SCG), was at all material 
times, a Utah professional corporation in the business of providing health care services to residents 
of Utah. Defendant SCG's principal place of business is located at 5169 Cottonwood Street, No. 
610, Murray, Utah. Defendant Sherman Sorensen owned and operated SCG as his primary medical 
practice. 
4. Defendant IHC Health Services, Inc. (IHC) is a not-for-profit corporation based in 
Salt Lake City, Utah with its principal place of business and corporate office at 36 S. State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111. IHC operates several healthcare facilities under d/b/a's, including 
Intermountain Medical Center, which has its principal place of business and corporate office at 
5100 South State Street, Murray, Utah. IHC's Registered Agent for Service is Anne D. Armstrong, 
36 South State St. Suite 2200, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
5. Upon information and belief, at all material times, each of the Defendants were, or 
may have been, an agent, servant, employer, employee, joint venture, partner, and/or alter ego of 
one or more of each of the remaining Defendants, and were at all times acting within the purpose 
and scope of such agency, servitude, joint venture, alter ego, partnership, or employment, and with 
the authority, consent, approval, andlor ratification of each remaining Defendant. 
6. At all material times, Defendants were health care providers within the meaning of 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-401 et seq., and each Defendant 
provided health care services to Lisa Tapp. 




8. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-307. 
9. In bringing this action, Plaintiff complied with all statutory requirements regarding 
pre-litigation review of this matter as set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-3-416. 
BACKGROUND 
10. This case is one of more than a thousand cases that are presently working their way 
through the prelitigation process, which involve the medically unnecessary heart surgery by Dr. 
Sherman Sorensen related to two kinds of holes in the heart. One is called an atrial septal defect 
(ASD), and the other is a patent foramen ovale (PFO). Both are holes in the wall of tissue (septum) 
between the left and right upper chambers of the heart ( atria). An ASD is considered a birth defect 
and is a failure of the septal tissue to form between the atria, PFO' s can only occur after birth when 
the foramen ovale fails to close. 1 
11. Life threatening ASD's are generally discovered at birth and corrected 
immediately. However, there are billions of adults who have small openings between the left and 
right atriums of their hearts.2 The foramen ovale is an opening located in the wall separating the 
two upper chambers of the heart, the atrial septum, which is used during fetal circulation to redirect 
blood through the heart. In 75% of the population, the foramen ovale closes at birth when increased 
blood pressure on the left side of the heart forces the opening to close. In those cases, where the 
foramen ovale does not close at birth, a patent foramen ovale (PFO) results. 
1 Dr. Sorensen at times earlier in his career referred to these two conditions interchangeably, but 
for insurance reimbursement purposes decided that all PFO's were ASD's later in his practice. 
Either way, and no matter what he called them, he closed holes indiscriminately and without 
medical justification on thousands of people including the Plaintiff. 
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12. Approximately 25% of the healthy population have a PFO and will never require 
any treatment or evaluation. Apart from extremely rare cases, patients with a PFO remain 
completely unaware of the presence of the PFO because it's ahnost never associated with 
symptoms. Persistent patency of the foramen ovale is considered a normal anatomic variation. 
13. Only if a patient has a recurrence of cryptogenic (originating from unexplained 
causes) stroke or transient ischemic attack (TIA), likely due to paradoxical embolization through 
a PFO, and despite optimal medical therapy, may it be appropriate to close the PFO. Generally, 
this closure is performed through a percutaneous surgical procedure. In the percutaneous 
procedure, a patient undergoes a cardiac catheterization to determine the size and location of the 
PFO. 
14. There has long been general agreement in the medical community-as far back as 
2003-that PFO closure is not medically necessary, except in the limited circumstances where 
there is a confirmed diagnosis of a recurrent cryptogenic stroke or TIA, despite optimum medical 
management. At all material times, no widely accepted medical group specializing in cardiology 
in the United States has ever recommended, advised, or suggested that closure is appropriate for 
stroke or migraine prevention to patients that have not had recurrent crypotogenic strokes. 
15. In 2011, Defendant IHC adopted internal Guidelines for Percutaneous Closure of 
Septal Defects of the Atrium that mirrored those promulgated by the American Heart 
Association/American Stroke Association (AHAlASA). The Guidelines state that "PFO closure 
may be considered for patients with recurrent cryptogenic stroke (CS) despite optimal medical 
therapy." The IHC Guidelines note that PFO closure is only appropriate for "recurrent, confirmed, 
clinical cryptogenic TIA or stroke." 
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16. PFO could also, under Defendant IHC's Guidelines, be considered for "patients 
with a single well-documented significant stroke or systemic emboli in a high-risk patient who has 
been comprehensively evaluated for alternative cause of embolic stroke." Under either 
circumstance, the Guidelines require that the cardiologists ensure that the diagnosis of PFO and 
cryptogenic stroke or embolism is confirmed by an independent neurology consult or a brain CT 
or MR!, a MRA of the head and neck, an ambulatory telemetry monitor for atrial fibrillation, and 
a TTE with bubbles to confirm the diagnosis. Defendant IHC's Guidelines make clear that PFO 
closure is never indicated for migraine headaches. 
17. Defendant IHC's Guidelines are clear that PFO closure for migraine can only be 
performed in the clinical trial setting and that there is currently "no RCT [randomized clinical 
trials] to support use of PFO closure in the treatment of migraine headaches or asymptomatic 
white-matter lesions." These latter two categories of symptoms are precisely what Defendant 
Sorensen treated Plaintiff for with a PFO closure. 
18. Defendant Sorensen frequently touted his excessive volume, touting that he has 
more than a "10 year/3000 device history" of utilizing various devices (i.e. Amplatzer and Gore) 
to perform PFO and ASD closures. Defendant Sorensen often referred patients to his "research" 
and "data" for PFO and ASD closures at www.sorensenmd.com. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
19. The following general allegations are common to all claims alleged herein: 
20. As noted, Defendant Dr. Sorensen is a cardiologist and was practicing 
interventional cardiology. He had privileges at Defendant IHC and at other hospitals. From roughly 
2002 to 2012, Defendant Sorensen performed more than 4,000 PFO and ASD closures, the 
majority of those at IHC. The administration at IHC was on notice because of the sheer volume 
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of the procedures performed by Defendant Sorensen and because of complaints from other 
practitioners and employees that Defendant Sorensen was engaged in a practice of regularly 
performing unnecessary, invasive cardiac procedures on his patients. Defendants enriched 
themselves by submitting false and fraudulent medical billing to insurance companies, including 
Plaintiff s, for medically unnecessary procedures. 
21. During the hiring and credentialing process at IHC, Sorensen advised mc 
representatives of the medical treatment he was qualified to perform, and specifically informed 
IHC how he would perform PFO closures. These procedures would include performing PFO and 
ASD closures on patients that did not have recurrent cryptogenic strokes. Despite this, Defendant 
IHC gave Sorensen hospital privileges, hired and paid him, and allowed him to utilize their 
catheterization laboratory to perform these PFO procedures. 
22. Sorensen's cardiac privileges at IHC were suspended on or about June 27, 2011, 
following an internal investigation concluded that Sorensen had performed multiple, medically 
unnecessary PFO closures and that Sorensen represented a threat to the health and safety of the 
patients treated at IHC. 
23. The letter from IHC to Defendant Sorensen informing him in writing of his 
suspension (effective June 27, 2011 through July 11,2011), stated that the suspension was "taken 
in good faith to prevent a threat to the health or safety of patients" at mc and to "provide the 
Medical Executive Committee the opportunity to further evaluate the patient care you have 
provided, your professional conduct within the hospital and [to] determine if additional action 
regarding your membership and privileges should be taken beyond the 14 day suspension." 
24. Dr. Sorensen's suspension was the direct result of the IHC's acknowledgement of 
what it had known for years, that Sorensen had performed thousands of medically unnecessary 
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PFO closures at IHe. The suspension was a reversal of sorts for IHe because it had long 
encouraged, profited, and provided a haven for Defendant Sorensen's practice. 
25. Further, Defendant Sorensen and IHe created false statements and documents to 
conceal the fact that Sorensen was performing medically unnecessary closures. These statements 
include documenting migraine or stroke history where none existed, such as Plaintiffs case. 
26. Defendant IHe supplied Sorensen with its catheterization lab facilities, hospital 
staff such as nurses, administrative, and other support staff, and privileges to perform these 
procedures whenever he saw fit, including for Plaintiff Lisa Tapp's PFO procedure in October 
2008. For example, the Patient Information pamphlet passed on to Plaintiff (and many other 
patients) touts "a dedicated, specialized team of echo, nursing, catheterization laboratory, and 
physician members" as "Why Our Program May Be Right For You" (Slide 30). 
27. Sorensen would routinely mislead his patients, who had no previous strokes or 
TIAs, into believing that they were at extreme risk of debilitating stroke because of their PFO or 
ASD. He would further mislead them that a closure procedure would be effective and was 
medically necessary in order to prevent strokes. These misrepresentations were made to the vast 
majority of his patients, including Plaintiff 
28. Despite his representations to his patients, Sorensen often created medical charts 
that falsely reflected that the patients had suffered from, or were at risk of suffering from, recurrent 
cryptogenic stroke in order to get insurance to pay for the procedure. The effort to disguise the true 
diagnosis and reason for the closures shows that Sorensen was always aware of and understood 
the true standard of care for these procedures. IHe knew or should have known through a cursory 
review of the patients' files that they did not meet the closure indications in the standard of care. 
7 
00128 
IHC, SCG, and Sorensen engaged in a conspiracy and/or concert of action, with each other to profit 
from the perpetuation of Sorensen's medically unnecessary closures. 
29. In a report released to the entire Department of Cardiology at IHC, it reported that 
the study showed that "compliance with the guidelines for performing PFO closures" at IHC was 
"less than ideal." The review showed that the Guidelines had been violated in many of the cases 
reviewed. 
30. Even though it did not issue these Guidelines until 2011, at all times relevant to this 
case, IHC knew that septal closures were rarely indicated. For years IHC ignored the loud 
objections from its own medical staff and leadership, including the Director of the Catheterization 
Laboratory, Dr. Revenaugh, and the Medical Director for Cardiovascular Services at 
Intermountain Healthcare, Dr. Donald L. Lappe, as well as written warnings and complaints from 
Professor Andrew Michaels of the University of Utah. Further, IHC was informed by Dr. Nancy 
Futrell, a neurologist who was a co-investigator with Defendant Sorensen on a trial performed at 
IHC for the closure devices used by Defendant Sorensen, that Defendant Sorensen was performing 
unnecessary closures outside of the criteria set by the trials. She spoke with several individuals 
associated with IHC regarding Dr. Sorensen, including Dr. Lappe, chief of cardiology; William 
Hamilton, medical director; Jeffrey Anderson, associate chief of cardiology; and Liz Hammond. 
31. After Sorensen's 14-day suspension, he returned to work at IHC on or about July 
12, 2011. It immediately became apparent that Sorensen had no intention of complying with the 
IHC Guidelines for PFO closures, and that he would continue to perform medically unnecessary 
procedures on patients not suffering from recurrent cryptogenic stroke despite optimal medical 
therapy. Because Sorensen refused to comply with the Guidelines and represented an immediate 
threat of harm to his patients, IHC moved to suspend Sorensen from practice in September 2011. 
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Sorensen and IHC entered a Settlement Agreement, which was designed to prevent his permanent 
suspension. However, within days of entering the Agreement, Sorensen was notified by IHC that 
he was in violation of the Agreement. IHC threatened to take immediate action to suspend him, 
and to report his misconduct to the National Practitioner Database. Sorensen promptly resigned to 
avoid these adverse consequences. 
32. InFa1l2011IWinter 2012, Dr. James L. Orford, listed in the Cardiology Department 
at Intermountain Health Center, authored an article "Understanding the Heart Defect - Patent 
Foramen Ovale" in The Classroom on Intermountain's website. This publication lists 
"Intermountain Medical Group" with a link at the bottom. 
33. Speaking on behalf ofIntermountain, Dr. Orford states the following: 
• "Because PFO is very common and never causes any problems in most patients, 
undergoing surgery to possibly prevent migraines and/or stroke usually isn't worth 
the risk." 
• "It has been noted that PFO is more common in patients who experience migraine 
with aura, but may patients with a PFO do not have migraine headaches and many 
migraine patients do not have a PFO." 
• "Furthermore, there is no conclusive evidence that fixing a PFO will benefit 
migraines." 
• "In a few cases, where patients have already suffered a confirmed cryptogenic 
stroke without any possible cause, closing a PFO may be a viable option to prevent 
future strokes." 
• "However, it is important to consult with a neurologist and a cardiologist to 
determine all of your options and whether surgical closure is recommended." 
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• "Patients are also encouraged to enroll in a clinical trial so their response to 
treatments can be studied, allowing scientists to learn more about this condition." 
• "As leaders in cardiology, Intermountain Realthcare is always very conscientious 
regarding how new technology is applied. For this reason, the Intermountain 
Medical Group instituted specific "Guidelines for Percutaneous Closure of Septal 
Defects" throughout all our hospitals and clinics." 
• "We believe it is important to have clear, positive evidence for both the short-term 
and long-term consequences of any procedure." 
Despite this publication and clear recognition, IRC did nothing to alert patients, including Lisa 
Tapp, that no "clear, positive" evidence existed that PFO closure was effective for stroke 
prevention in absence of a history of cryptogenic strokes or for migraine headache prevention. 
34. Defendant IRC also published "Fact Sheet for Patients and Families - PFO and 
ASD Closure in the Cath Lab" with a publication range of 2011-2016. Among the recognized 
risks of a PFO or ASD Closure include: temporary leg numbness or weakness in the first few 
hours, bruising, bleeding, infection, or blood vessel damage whether cathether(s) were inserted, 
damage to the heart muscle that may require open heart surgery, abnormal heart rhythm, blood 
clots, heart attack or stroke, negative reaction to anesthetic or dye, and unforeseen complications. 
While these risks are "uncommon" they are present for PFO and ASD Closures. The Fact Sheet 
for Patients and Families also states the following: 
• "Why Might I need a PFO or ASD Closure? You might need a PFO closure if you've 
had a stroke that is related to PFO." 
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• "What are the benefits of a PFO or ASD closure procedure? PFO Closure has not been 
found to reliably reduce migraines. Also, it is not indicated unless you've had a 
previous TIA or stroke." 
35. Despite the results of this audit, patient literature representations, stated opinion of 
IHC cardiologists, and ample evidence that Defendant Sorensen had performed thousands ofPFO 
closures, D~fendant IHC deliberately and consciously chose not to expand its audit to other PFO 
closure patients from past years, including Plaintiff Lisa Tapp Defendant IHC never released 
information to the public that Sorensen had performed medically unnecessary PFO procedures, as 
this information was kept internal. 
36. IHC made a deliberate and conscious decision not to inform patients that they may 
have had a medically unnecessary surgery, and chose not to reimburse Plaintiff Lisa Tapp, her 
insurance company, (or any patients) who had procedures performed unnecessarily. Instead, IHC 
kept the profits for itself. 
PLAINTIFF LISA TAPP'S PFO CLOSURE AND INJURIES 
37. Plaintiff Lisa Tapp was 43 years old when she underwent the percutaneous closure 
of a patent foramen oval at Intermountain Medical Center in Salt Lake County on September 18, 
2008. The procedure was performed by Defendant Sherman Sorensen, M.D. using an 18 millimeter 
Amplatzer septal occlude device-a device not approved by the FDA for use in this manner. The 
safety and efficacy for using the Amplatzer device in a PFO closure to prevent strokes on patients 
without recurrent cryptogenic stroke has never been established, even to this day. 
38. In fact, at all material times the Amplatzer septal occcluder has been indicated for 
patients with "echocardiographic evidence of ostium secundum atrial septal defect." The 
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Amplatzer instructions for use unequivocally state, "The use of this device has not been studied in 
patients with patent foreman ovale." 
39. Prior to Lisa's percutaneous closure, she underwent a neurological history and 
physical by Walter Reichert M.D. on August 15, 2008. The patient described a two-month history 
of continuous paresthesias in the back of the neck and head. She also described "mild numbness 
in her right thumb and hand while she is seated." Importantly, a detailed neurological exam did 
not show any abnormalities; specifically, there were no motor/strength deficits and no sensory 
deficits. 
40. On August 20, 2008, a brain MRI, MRA of the intracranial arteries and an MRI of 
the cervical spine were performed at Western Neurological Associates, where Dr. Reichert 
practiced. The brain MRI was interpreted to show about fifteen bilateral non-specific white matter 
lesions. A differential diagnosis is given for this fmding: "includes demyelinating disease, 
migraine headaches, vasculitis/inflammatory disease, chronic microvascular ischemic disease, 
hypertension and post-traumatic sequela." The differential diagnosis did not include embolic 
strokes or events. 
41. On September 2, 2008, Lisa received a transthoracic echo cardiogram and 
trans cranial doppler study in Defendant Sorensen's office, SeG. The transthoracic echo is 
interpreted to show an abnormal bubble study consistent with a right to left shunt across the atrial 
septum and the trans cranial doppler study is interpreted to show 5/5 conductance with a valsalva 
maneuver. The 5/5 conductance is used to place the patient at "high risk stratification for stroke." 
42. On this same day, Defendant Sorensen performed a history and physical on Lisa. 
Among Defendant Sorensen's findings, he concluded that Lisa did not have hyper coagulability 
(despite a lack of testing for this), that she developed "well-defined symptoms of hemisensory" 
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(despite no evidence of this in Lisa's neurological exam), and that she had a history of migraines 
(despite Lisa's own claims to the contrary). Defendant Sorensen went on to state that Lisa had "a 
change in her level of consciousness" and that her "right-sided weakness has been persistent." 
None of these findings were reflected in Lisa's neurological exam. Defendant Sorensen claims the 
non-specific white matter lesions seen on Lisa's brain MRI "are, therefore, most likely embolic." 
Defendant Sorensen made this diagnosis with virtually no medical support. 
43. To persuade Plaintiff to undergo a PFO closure, Defendant Sorensen represented 
to Plaintiff that she was at high risk of a debilitating stroke due to the presence of her PFOIASD. 
In truth, the mere presence of the defect, without more, including a history of cryptogenic stroke, 
is not a significant risk factor for stroke. Further, Sorensen passed out a Patient Information Patent 
Foreman Ovale (PFO) handout to Plaintiff. Sorensen's patient literature contained fraudulent 
misrepresentations, unsupported data and statistics, outright falsehoods, and other misleading 
statements, such as the following: 
• "Until recently, 40% of all strokes were unknown cause. We now know that most of 
these unexplained strokes may be caused by a PFO (Patent Foramen Ovale)" (Stroke 
and PFO Slide 2). 
• "Strokes resulting from septal defects have a 50% mortality rate." 
• "PFO is diagnosed in 50-70% of patients with stroke of unknown cause" (What is 
Known About PFO and Stroke Slide 12). 
• "Continued lifelong risk of stroke ranging from 2-9% each year." (PFO Treatment 
Options AspiriniPlavixiCoumadin Slide 17). 
• "Stroke reduction to less than 1 %" (PFO Treatment Options Catheter Closure ofPFO). 
• "Septal Defect Closure Safety and Efficacy" (Slide 28). 
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• "Our rigorous Program requirements assure that you are informed and receive the safest 
and most effective treatment" (Why Our Program Might Be Right For You Slide 30). 
These statements induced and persuaded Plaintiff to undergo a PFO closure at IHe by inducing 
fear of an imminent and debilitating stroke, downplaying safer and accepted treatment options, 
misrepresenting the indication for PFO in the medical community, and downplaying the risks of 
PFO closure. 
44. Further, Plaintiffs medical records authorized by Defendant Sorensen are replete 
with fraudulent misrepresentations, falsehoods, and other misleading statements containing 
information presented to Plaintiff to induce her to have the closure procedure. These statements 
include: 
• "Our approach is a preventative strategy. It is scientifically based, but it is an 
aggressive strategy." In fact, Dr. Sorenson's method has never been accepted in any 
scientific journal, organization, been approved for a randomized clinical trial, and/or 
the peer review process for his data and proposed indication for PFO closure. "We, 
therefore follow a preventative strategy and risk stratify patients based on the 
studies ... proposed by the American Academy of Neurology." That is false; the AAN 
did not recommend closure outside of clinical trials and encouraged patients to 
participate in research protocols. 
• "8 studies demonstrate that very high flow is the main feature of stroke risk." In fact, 
the AAN Practice Parameter did not find an association, much less causation, of 
shunting and risk of stroke recurrence. 
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• "Randomized trials are not available currently." In reality, the Closure I trial was 
opened in Salt Lake City, Utah. It was halted due to Defendant Sorensen's medically 
unnecessary off-label PFO procedures of patients outside the trial. 
• "Coumadin is considered to be unsafe and ineffective ... based on studies." In fact, the 
SPIRIT, W ASID and W ARRS studies showed no such thing. 
• Within Plaintiffs medical records, Sorenson noted that Ms. Tapp had a history of 
migraine. That too was false, misleading, and inaccurate. Dr. Sorenson made this 
notation without any objective evidence. 
• Defendant Sorenson certified that his echocardiography lab was certified by ICAEL 
(Intersocietal Commission for Accreditation Laboratories) using the ICAEL logo on 
his echochardiogram. In fact, his lab was never accredited by ICAEL and this was 
false. 
Plaintiff was unaware of the misrepresentations and falsehoods in her medical records and instead 
trusted what the Defendants had told her during her of treatment. Further, and even if she had been 
aware of some the factual mischaracterizations, as non-expert she could not have understood their 
implications as it relates the appropriateness of her medical treatment. 
45. Ultimately, Defendant Sorensen performed the percutaneous closure on September 
18, 2008, at Defendant IHC's Cardiac Catheterization Laboratory. The following day, a 
transthoracic echocardiogram was performed at Defendant IHC on Lisa prior to discharge. A 
color-flow doppler test was not performed to evaluate the atrial septum for a residual shunt, which 
was ostensibly one of the reasons for closing Lisa's PFO. 
46. In a patient with strong or definitive evidence for embolic stroke, the standard of 
care requires a comprehensive evaluation for all of the causes of embolic stroke. This was not 
15 
00136 
performed by Dr. Sorensen in his care of Plaintiff. A comprehensive evaluation for causes of 
"cryptogenic" stroke includes an MRI of the brain (which was done in this case), imaging of the 
extra cranial and intracranial cerebral arteries, 3-4 week rhythm monitoring to look for paroxysmal 
atrial fibrillation, imaging of the aorta to look for atherosclerotic disease, lower extremity venous 
doppler/ultrasound, MRV of the abdominal and pelvic veins, and a hyper coagulability workup. 
Sorensen did not conduct this evaluation on Plaintiff. 
47. Defendant IRe was aware that this type of off-label medically unnecessary PFO 
closure was being performed on hundreds of patients, including Plaintiff, during this time of 
October 2008 as Defendant Sorensen had informed Defendant IRe he would perform the 
procedure in this manner. 
48. On October 15,2008, Lisa Tapp was seen by Defendant Sorensen for a follow-up 
visit. Lisa complained of palpitations and a rapid heart rate. Defendant Sorensen did not screen 
Lisa for atrial fibrillation, which carries with it the risk of stroke. 
49. Because of Defendants' conduct, Lisa suffered damages, including undergoing an 
unnecessary surgical procedure and hospital stay, as well as medical expenses, physical pain, and 
emotional anguish. 
50. Despite IRe's awareness of Sorensen's fraudulent and/or negligent practices, it did 
nothing to notify Plaintiff. Instead, IRe actively allowed Sorensen's practice to continue in order 
to profit from the thousands of unnecessary procedures performed on patients like Plaintiff. In fact, 
IRe has to this day actively concealed its knowledge about Sorensen's rogue and fraudulent 
practices at its facility from patients, third party payers, and the public, and has retained the money 
earned off of Sorensen's medically unnecessary surgeries. 
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51. The FDA issued a warning about serious erosion events with Amp1atzer Septal 
Occluder devices in October 2013. Although erosion events are not currently an issue for Lisa 
Tapp, the Amplatzer Septal Occluder device is permanently implanted and carries this risk. 
52. IRe sent a letter to patients around February 2014 alerting patients who had an 
Amplatzer Septal Occluder device implanted about the FDA's findings with a link to the FDA 
announcement and St. Jude patient advisory. The letter sent to patients did not mention anything 
about Dr. Sorensen, the PFO closure procedure itself, or that medical malpractice may have 
occurred. Nor did the letter inform patients, including Lisa Tapp, that the PFO closure was 
medically unnecessary to begin with, that the use of this device for PFO closure had not been 
studied, accepted, and/or approved in the medical community, and that Defendant Sorensen had 
asserted misrepresentations, falsehoods, half-truths, and engaged in other deceptive acts. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE (HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE) 
53. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
54. Defendants, individually, collectively, and through the acts and omissions of their 
agents, servants, employees, physicians, nurses, therapists, and technologists (hereinafter 
collectively "Defendants") accepted Plaintiff as a patient, and thereby assumed various duties of 
care. 
55. At all relevant times, Defendants held themselves out as being able to provide full 
care and treatment for patients requiring medical care of the type that Plaintiff required, including, 
but not limited to, paresthesias in the back of the neck and head and non-specific white matter 
lesions, among other things. 
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56. The degree of care and treatment provided to Plaintiff fell below the acceptable 
standards of care for the types of medical care and treatment required by Plaintiff and provided by 
Defendants. 
57. Specifically, Defendants breached the applicable standards of care in multiple ways 
including, but not limited to: 
a. Falsifying Plaintiff's medical records to indicate that Plaintiff was an appropriate 
candidate for closure; 
b. Misleading Plaintiff regarding the risks and benefits associated with closure and 
regarding the necessity of treatment; 
c. Failing to obtain an adequate history which resulted in an improper medical 
diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate candidate for closure; 
d. Failing to conduct an adequate physical and to obtain appropriate diagnostic testing, 
which resulted in an improper medical diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate 
candidate for PFO closure; Performing a medically unnecessary medical procedure 
with a device that was not FDA approved for this use; 
e. Failing to test for residual shunting after performing the PFO closure; and 
f. Failing to screen Plaintiff for atrial fibrillation when she presented with palpitations 
and a rapid heart rate. 
58. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omissions, 
Defendants caused Plaintiff to undergo unnecessary medical procedures, testing, and follow-up 




59. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omissions, 
Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including by not limited to unnecessary medical 
procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional anguish. 
60. Plaintiff has therefore been injured and is entitled to recover general and special 
damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE 
61. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
62. At all relevant times, Defendants owed Plaintiff various duties of care, including 
but not limited to common law and statutory duties. 
63. Defendants, individually and collectively, breached these duties of care. 
64. As a sole, .proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omission, 
Defendants caused personal and other injuries to Plaintiff. 
65. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in 
amounts to be determined at trial. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
66. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
67. Defendants, individually and collectively, represented to Plaintiff that medical 
procedures, testing, and follow-up visits were medically necessary. 
68. Defendants' representations that Plaintiffs medical procedures, testing, and 
follow-up visits were medically necessary was, in fact, not true. 
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69. Defendants failed to use reasonable care to determine whether the representations 
regarding the necessity of Plaintiff's medical care was true. 
70. Defendants were in a better position than Plaintiff to know the true facts regarding 
Plaintiff's medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care. 
71. Defendants had a financial interest in performing medically unnecessary 
procedures, testing, and follow-up care on Plaintiff. 
72. Plaintiff relied on Defendants' representations, and it was reasonable for her to do 
so. 
73. Plaintiff has therefore been injured as a result of relying on Defendants' 
representations and is entitled to recover general and special damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING 
74. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
75. Defendant me owes a duty to patients to exercise reasonable care in the selection 
of its medical staff and in granting specialized privileges to them. It also has the duty to periodically 
monitor and review the qualifications and competency of its medical staff. 
76. Defendant IRe breached its duty to exercise reasonable care in its selection of its 
medical staff, and in granting specialized privileges to and periodically monitoring and reviewing 
the qualifications and competency of its medical staff. 
77. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of its breach, Defendant IRe caused 
harm to Plaintiff. 
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78. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in 
an amount to be determined at trial. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUDULANT NON-DISCLOSURE/CONCEALMENT 
79. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
80. Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffto disclose important facts, such as the medical 
necessity of Plaintiffs medical care, to Plaintiff. 
81. Defendants knew that the medical care Defendants provided to Plaintiff was not 
medically necessary, and failed to disclose this to Plaintiff. 
82. Plaintiff did not know that the medical care provided by Defendants was not 
medically necessary. 
83. Defendants' failure to disclose the fact that Plaintiffs medical care was not 
necessary was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs damages. Had Plaintiff known that her 
closure surgery was not necessary, Plaintiff would not have undergone the surgery. 
84. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages 
in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUD 
85. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
86. At all relevant times, Defendants had a duty and obligation to disclose to Plaintiff 
true facts concerning the medical care provided to Plaintiff by Defendants. 
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87. Defendants intentionally concealed material facts concerning Plaintiffs medical 
care from Plaintiff including, but not limited to the following: 
a. Falsifying Plaintiffs medical records to indicate that she was an appropriate 
candidate for closure; 
b. Performing medically unnecessary medical procedures with a device that was not 
FDA approved for this use; and 
c. Concealing from Plaintiff that medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care was 
unnecessary. 
88. Defendants made false statements and misrepresentations about important facts 
regarding Plaintiff s medical care. 
89. Defendants made these false statements and misrepresentations described above 
knowing that the statements were false, or with reckless disregard for their truth. 
90. Defendants made the false statements and misrepresentations to Plaintiff, with the 
intent that Plaintiff would rely on the statements. 
91. Plaintiff did reasonably rely on the false statements and misrepresentations made 
by Defendants. 
92. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' false statements and 
misrepresentations, Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including but not limited to 
unnecessary medical procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional 
anguish. 
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: CIVIL CONSPIRACY 
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93. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
94. Defendants were acting in a conspiracy to commit fraud, thereby increasing their 
profits through the performance of medically unnecessary procedures on patients, including 
Plaintiff. 
95. There was an agreement and meeting of the minds among Defendant Sorensen, 
Defendant SeG, and Defendant IRe to misrepresent the need for and induce patients, including 
Plaintiff, into undergoing medically unnecessary procedures, testing, and follow-up. Defendants 
agreed to act in concert in making these misrepresentations about the necessity of medical 
procedures to Plaintiff. 
96. There were multiple unlawful, overt acts by Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SeG, 
and Defendant IRe in furtherance of their scheme, including without limitation, Defendants' 
fraud. 
97. As a result of this conspiracy, Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SeG, and Defendant 
IRe, should be held jointly and severally liable for the conduct of the other co-conspirators and 
the damages that Plaintiff sustained as a proximate result thereof, including without limitation 
personal injuries and other injuries. 
98. Plaintiff would further show that Defendant Sorensen and Defendant SeG were 
operating as alter egos for the purpose of perpetrating the above described conspiracy. There was 
such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the company and the 
individual did not exist. Observing the corporate form will sanction this conspiracy, promote 
injustice, and allow an inequitable result. 
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EOUITABLE TOLLINGIFRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT 
99. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
100. Because of Defendants' concealment of material facts and misleading conduct, 
Plaintiff was not aware of her causes of action. 
101. Plaintiff found out about her cause of action only after learning of Defendants' 
conduct through lawyer advertising in 2017. 
102. Defendants took affirmative steps to conceal Plaintiffs cause of action. Given 
Defendants' concealment and misleading conduct, a reasonable plaintiff would not have 
discovered the cause of action earlier. 
103. IHe, through its employees, physicians, internal audit, and Sorensen's own 
representations was well aware that Sorensen had performed medically unnecessary PFO and ASD 
closures on patients such as Plaintiff, but chose not to conduct a more expansive audit and/or 
inform patients that had an unnecessary surgery. 
104. Neither Sorenson, nor IHe ever notified Plaintiff that she had received an 
unnecessary procedure, that she was never indicated for the surgery to begin with, that the device 
implanted into Plaintiff was never medically necessary, was retained in her body for no medical 
purpose, and that the informed consent contained fraudulent, misleading, and/or incomplete 
statements. Neither Sorenson, nor IHe, ever compensated Plaintiff for the unnecessary medical 
surgery she underwent by reimbursing the costs of the procedure. 
105. Neither Sorensen, nor IHe, ever made a public statement, sent a letter, made a 
public announcement, or issued a press release to inform patients, such as Plaintiff Lisa Tapp, may 
have had a medically unnecessary PFO closure at IHe at any time. 
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106. Defendants' misrepresentations and misleading conduct constitutes fraudulent 
concealment that equitably tolls any proffered statute of limitation that may otherwise bar the 
recovery sought by Plaintiff. 
107. Plaintiff did not know, nor should have known, of the causes of action against 
Defendants prior to being put on notice of Defendants' potential liability in 2017. She neither 
discovered, nor reasonably should have discovered, the facts underlying her causes of action before 
any proffered statute oflimitations period expired. 
lOS. As a result of Defendants' concealment of the true character, quality and nature of 
their conduct, they are estopped from relying on any statute of limitations defense. Defendants' 
affirmative acts and omissions, before, during, and/or after their actions causing Plaintiffs injury 
prevented Plaintiff from discovering the injury or cause thereof until recently in 2017. Such 
conduct tolls the limitations pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 7SB-3-404(b). 
109. Defendants' conduct, because it was purposely committed, was known or should 
have been known by them to be dangerous, heedless, reckless, and without regard to the 
consequences or the rights and safety of Plaintiff. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgment (under URCP: Tier 3) against Defendants in an 
amount to be determined by the trier of fact for the following damages: 
a. F or special damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 
b. For general damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 
c. For pre and post judgment interest on all special damages pursuant to Utah law; 
d. For costs and attorney fees to the extent allowed by law; and 
e. For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of November 2017. 
/s/ Rhome D. Zabriskie 
Rhome D. Zabriskie 
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC 
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Tel: (801) 375-7680 
Fax: (801) 375-7686 
Email: rhomelawyer@yahoo.com 
FLEMING, NOLEN & JEZ, LLP 
Rand P. Nolen (Pro Hac Vice submission in 
progress) 
David L. Hobbs (Pro Hac Vice submission in 
progress) 
2800 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 4000 
Houston, TX 77056-6109 
Telephone: (713) 621-7944 
Facsimile: (713) 621-9638 
Email: rand_nolen@fleming-Iaw.com 
Email: davidjIobbs@flerning-law.com 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that that a true and exact copy of the foregoing has been served on the following 
via the Court's ECF filing system and/or Email on 21 ST day of November, 2017: 
Alan C. Bradshaw 
Sammi V. Anderson 
John (Jack) T. Nelson 
Mitch M. Longson 
Manning, Curtis, Bradshaw & Bednar PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1300 







Attorneys for IHC Health Services, Inc. 
Michael J. Miller 
Strong & Hanni 
102 South 200 East, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
mmiller@strongandhanni.com 
Attorney for Defendants Sherman Sorensen, MD. and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group 
lsi Rhome D. Zabriskie 
Rhome D. Zabriskie 
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